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Over the past few years, the State of California has endured some 
of the worst fire seasons on record.  In 2020, over one million acres 
burned across the San Francisco Bay Area, Northern California, and 
the Central San Joaquin Valley—conditions which created a public 
safety and health emergency in the midst of an ongoing pandemic.  In 
2019, the Kincade Fire set ablaze nearly 78,000 acres in Northern 
California, but coincided with widespread power shutoffs impacting 
millions of customers throughout the state.  In 2018, we learned of the 
devastation in Butte County, where the Camp Fire destroyed the 
community of Paradise, California, and claimed the lives of eighty-six 
people.  To confront wildfire threats of such magnitude, the three largest 
energy providers in California—Pacific Gas & Electric, Southern 
California Edison, and San Diego Gas & Electric—have executed 
Public Safety Power Shutoffs (de-energization) as one response to 
mitigate public safety concerns.  The California Public Utilities 
Commission (CPUC) oversees all utilities operating within the state.  
The CPUC authorizes PG&E, SCE, SDG&E, and all other intrastate 
utilities to de-energize their power lines, but only as a measure of last 
resort when dangerous fire conditions present an imminent threat to 
public safety. 
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While de-energization serves as a useful tool, it equally carries the 
potential for abuse.  PG&E stands as a notable example.  The CPUC 
evaluates de-energization execution for reasonableness but does not 
inquire into other critical areas of relevant information: the condition of 
electrical infrastructure, utility infrastructure repairs or investments 
performed, or the financial status of the de-energizing utility.  To ensure 
utilities remain committed to their regulatory duties of promoting public 
safety by delivering safe and reliable power to the public, this Note 
recommends the CPUC incorporate an infrastructure investment inquiry 
into its de-energization reasonableness review.  As our electrical grid 
deteriorates, environmental conditions worsen, and PG&E (the largest 
of the three utility providers in California) emerges from bankruptcy, the 
danger of de-energization becoming a general utility wildfire response 
continues to increase.  Without closer utility infrastructure scrutiny 
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In October 2019, Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E), 
Southern California Edison (SCE), and San Diego Gas & Electric 
(SDG&E) executed a series of widespread Public Safety Power Shutoffs 
(PSPS)—also known as de-energization—across the State of 
California.1  In doing so, PG&E cut power to nearly two million 
customers within its service territory extending throughout the San 
Francisco Bay Area, Northern California, and the Central San Joaquin 
Valley; SCE to over 180,000 customers in Southern California; and 
SDG&E to nearly 30,000 of its customers.2  The shutoffs garnered 
criticism from the public and state officials, but within two weeks, 
PG&E warned of another large de-energization event.3  On October 26, 
 
 1. SAFETY AND ENFORCEMENT DIVISION, PUBLIC REPORT ON THE LATE 2019 PUBLIC 
SAFETY POWER SHUTOFF EVENTS 2-3 (2020) [hereinafter SED 2019 PSPS REPORT]. 
 2. See id. at 2-3; Marisa Sotolongo et al., California Power Shutoffs: Deficiencies in 
Data and Reporting, INITIATIVE FOR ENERGY JUST., Oct. 2020, at 5, https://iejusa.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/10/V3.3-Policy-Brief-CA-Shutoffs-Data-Brief.pdf. 
 3.  See generally SED 2019 PSPS REPORT, supra note 1; Letter from Marybel Batjer, 
President, Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, to William Johnson, President, Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. 
(2019) [hereinafter CPUC Letter to PG&E]; see also Emma Newburger, More than 2 million 
people expected to lose power in PG&E blackout as California wildfires rage, CNBC (Oct. 
26, 2019, 2:26 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/26/pge-will-shut-off-power-to-940000-
customers-in-northern-california-to-reduce-wildfire-risk.html. 
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the utility followed suit and implemented another round of electrical 
blackouts impacting approximately three million Californians.4 
Utility-initiated power shutoffs of this magnitude were 
unprecedented for California.5  Yet, for PG&E and its broad customer 
base, such planned power outages have transformed into the new normal 
with the potential for lasting the next five years and beyond as the utility 
initiates repairs to its extensive and decaying electrical infrastructure—
all while PG&E emerges from bankruptcy proceedings.6  De-
energization is one response PG&E has employed following its multi-
billion dollar judgment for the 2018 Camp Fire—to date, the deadliest 
wildfire in California history.7  The cause of this devastating blaze: 
PG&E’s failing infrastructure and operational mismanagement.8  Over 
18,000 structures were destroyed, 153,000 acres burned, and eighty-six 
people were killed.9  Following a lengthy investigation, a Butte County 
Grand Jury criminally indicted PG&E for the Camp Fire.10  On March 
17, 2020, PG&E pled guilty to eighty-four individual counts of 
 
 4.  Dan Brekke, Lights Back On for More Than 335,000 PG&E Customers Who Lost 
Power in Safety Shutoff, KQED (Oct. 27, 2020), https://www.kqed.org/news/11843472/pge-
public-safety-power-shutoff-red-flag-warning. 
 5. See CPUC Letter to PG&E, supra note 3. 
 6. Full Committee Hearing to Examine the Impacts of Wildfire on Electric Grid 
Reliability, SENATE COMM. ON ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES (Dec. 19, 2019), 
https://www.energy.senate.gov/hearings/2019/12/full-committee-hearing-to-examine-the-
impacts-of-wildfire-on-electric-grid-reliability [hereinafter Senate Committee Wildfire 
Hearing] (“I think for us, in Northern California, it will take us probably five years to get to 
the point where we can largely eliminate this tool.”); see also Ethan Howland & Paul 
Ciampoli, PG&E CEO sees power shutoffs continuing for five years, AM. PUB. POWER ASS’N 
(Jan. 2, 2020), https://www.publicpower.org/periodical/article/pge-ceo-sees-power-shutoffs-
continuing-five-years. 
 7. Press Release, Cal. Dep’t of Forestry & Fire Prot., CAL FIRE Investigators 
Determine Cause of the Camp Fire (May 15, 2019) (on file with author). 
 8. See Susie Cagle, This Is Why California Will Keep Burning, VICE (Apr. 17, 2019, 
9:21 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/qvygeq/this-is-why-california-will-keep-
burning. 
 9.  Meghan Bobrowsky, Camp Fire death toll rises to 86 after man who suffered third-
degree burns dies, SACRAMENTO BEE (Aug. 8, 2019, 5:25 PM), 
https://www.sacbee.com/news/california/fires/article233683422.html; see also Cleve R. 
Wootson, Jr., The deadliest, most destructive wildfire in California’s history has finally been 
contained, WASH. POST (Nov. 26, 2018, 4:22 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2018/11/25/camp-fire-deadliest-wildfire-
californias-history-has-been-contained/. 
 10. Plea Agreement and Settlement 1-7, California v. PG&E, Case No. 2OCF01422, 
SUPERIOR CT. OF THE ST. OF CAL., COUNTY OF BUTTE (Mar. 17, 2020) [hereinafter PG&E 
Plea Agreement]; Press Release, Butte Cty. Dist. Attorney, DA Ramsey Confirms PG&E 
Filing About Pleading Guilty to 85 Count Criminal Indictment on Camp Fire Deaths 1 (Mar. 
23, 2020) [hereinafter Butte County Press Release]. 
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Involuntary Manslaughter, one count of Unlawfully Causing a Fire, and 
other charges related to causing great bodily harm.11 
In 2019, PG&E infrastructure was again implicated in another 
blaze—the Kincade Fire in Sonoma County.12  There, the blaze burned 
nearly 78,000 acres, destroyed 374 structures, and forced the evacuation 
of more than 180,000 people.13  On July 16, 2020, Cal Fire confirmed 
the fire “was caused by electrical transmission lines owned and operated 
by Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) located northeast of 
Geyserville.”14  Cal Fire submitted its report to the Sonoma County 
District Attorney, and on April 6, 2021, its office formally charged 
PG&E with five felonies and twenty-eight misdemeanors connected 
with the Kincade Fire.15 
California law authorizes investor-owned utilities (IOUs) to de-
energize electrical lines when increased fire risks pose imminent threats 
to public safety.16  SDG&E and SCE have implemented de-energization 
in the past, and SDG&E itself stands as a wildfire mitigation model.17  
 
 11.  Butte County Press Release, supra note 10, at 1; Elisha Fieldstadt, PG&E to plead 
guilty to involuntary manslaughter in California Camp Fire, NBC NEWS (Mar. 23, 2020, 
10:47 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/pg-e-plead-guilty-manslaughter-
california-camp-fire-n1166471. 
 12. CPUC, PG&E’S INCIDENT REPORT TO THE CALIFORNIA P.U.C. (2019), 
http://s1.q4cdn.com/880135780/files/doc_downloads/2019/10/IR.pdf. 
 13.  Dale Kasler, California blames PG&E for Kincade Fire in wine country. Criminal 
charges coming?, SACRAMENTO BEE (July 16, 2020, 2:44 PM), 
https://www.sacbee.com/news/california/fires/article244283752.html. 
 14.  Cal. Dep’t of Forestry & Fire Prot, Cal Fire Investigators Determine Cause of 
Kincade Fire, YUBANET.COM (July 16, 2020), https://yubanet.com/california/cal-fire-
investigators-determine-cause-of-the-kincade-fire/ [hereinafter Cause of Kincade Fire] (“The 
Kincade Fire in Sonoma County . . . burned a total of 77,758 acres, destroyed 374 structures 
and caused four non-life threatening injuries. After a very meticulous and thorough 
investigation, CAL FIRE has determined that the Kincade Fire was caused by electrical 
transmission lines owned and operated by [PG&E][.]”). See also Kasler, supra note 13. 
 15. Cause of Kincade Fire, supra note 14; see also Press Release, Sonoma Cty. Dist. 
Attorney, Criminal Charges Filed Against PG&E Related to the Kincade Fire (Apr. 6, 2021) 
[hereinafter Sonoma County Press Release]. 
 16. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 451 (1977); CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 399.2 (2001); CAL. 
PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, DECISION ADOPTING PHASE 2 UPDATED AND ADDITIONAL 
GUIDELINES FOR DE-ENERGIZATION OF ELECTRIC FACILITIES TO MITIGATE WILDFIRE RISK, 
DECISION 20-05-051, at 2 (2020) [hereinafter CPUC DECISION 20-05-051]; CAL. PUB. UTILS. 
COMM’N, RESOLUTION EXTENDING DE-ENERGIZATION REASONABLENESS, NOTIFICATION, 
MITIGATION AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS IN DECISION 12-04-024 TO ALL ELECTRIC 
INVESTOR OWNED UTILITIES, RESOLUTION ESRB-8, at 2 (2018) [hereinafter ESRB-8]; CAL. 
PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, DECISION GRANTING PETITION TO MODIFY DECISION 09-09-030 AND 
ADOPTING FIRE SAFETY REQUIREMENTS FOR SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY, 
DECISION 12-04-024, at 36 (2012) [hereinafter CPUC DECISION 12-04-024]. 
 17. See generally CPUC DECISION 20-05-051, supra note 16, at 6; see Letter from Cal. 
Pub. Utils. Comm’n, to San Diego Gas & Elec. (Oct. 14, 2019) [hereinafter CPUC Letter to 
SDG&E]. 
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PG&E can similarly shut off its lines.18  While all three can exercise de-
energization authority, the scale and scope of PG&E’s recent power 
shutoffs dwarf SDG&E practices.19 
The California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) retains 
jurisdictional review when evaluating whether de-energization action 
plans adhere to notification and mitigation requirements.20  Equally 
important, the CPUC determines whether planned power shutoff events 
remain consistent with other public utility duties under Commission 
rules, orders, and decisions.21  Neither California law nor the CPUC 
demand de-energization when dangerous weather conditions threaten 
electrical infrastructure and public safety.22  Rather, the CPUC entrusts 
utilities to exercise reasonable judgment when executing shutoffs as a 
measure of last resort.  Public Utilities Code sections 451, 399, and 399.2 
still hold utilities accountable for promoting public safety by safe and 
reliable operation of electrical facilities and delivering electrical service 
at just and reasonable rates.23  Thus, de-energization falls under the 
discretion of the utility—not the CPUC.24 
Yet for PG&E, broad PSPS authority threatens to undermine public 
safety by transforming a tool of last resort into a general wildfire 
response based on several factors: (1) its recent emergence from 
bankruptcy, (2) PG&E pleading guilty to eighty-four criminal charges 
for involuntary manslaughter, and (3) its vastly decaying electrical 
infrastructure—infrastructure responsible for the destructive Camp Fire 
and for igniting the Kincade Fire.25  The current COVID-19 pandemic 
 
 18. ESRB-8, supra note 16, at 5; CPUC DECISION 12-04-024, supra note 16, at 36; See 
also CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, ASSIGNED COMMISSIONER’S RULING REGARDING PACIFIC 
GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY’S POST-PUBLIC SAFETY POWER SHUTOFF CORRECTIVE 
ACTION REPORTING 4 (2020) [hereinafter ASSIGNED COMMISSIONER’S RULING] (requiring 
from PG&E detailed reports regarding corrective actions taken following its massive de-
energization event). 
 19. CPUC Letter to SDG&E, supra note 17, at 1-2; but see CPUC Letter to PG&E, supra 
note 3, at 2; see also Senate Committee Wildfire Hearing, supra note 6, at 1:00:37 (“The use 
of PSPS goes back to the early 2000s in California after fires in 2007 at San Diego Gas & 
Electric. Twelve years later they’re [SDG&E] still doing PSPS events, but in a very narrow 
surgical way.”). 
 20. See ESRB-8, supra note 16, at 8; CPUC DECISION 12-04-024, supra note 16, at 35. 
 21. See ESRB-8, supra note 16, at 5; see also CPUC DECISION 12-04-024, supra note 
16, at 35. 
 22. See ESRB-8, supra note 16, at 8. 
 23. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 451 (1977); CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE §§ 399, 399.2 (2001). 
ESRB-8, supra note 16, at 8 (“We expect an IOU to use its best judgment on a case-by-case 
basis to determine whether de-energization is needed for public safety.”); Press Release, Cal. 
Pub. Utils. Comm’n, CPUC Takes Action to Hold Communications Companies Accountable 
and Increase Public Safety 1 (2019) [hereinafter CPUC Takes Action]. 
 24. ESRB-8, supra note 16, at 8. 
 25.  See generally Press Release, PG&E, PG&E Obtains All Financing Necessary to 
Emerge from Chapter 11 and for Ongoing Operations (July 1, 2020), 
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further exacerbates public safety dangers emanating from widespread 
power shutoffs by risking households reliant on electricity for telework, 
distance learning, telemedicine, and medical equipment necessary for 
survival.26  Some communities already confronted the double hardship 
of energy blackouts coupled with shelter-in-place orders, and several 
counties have sounded the alarm for CPUC regulatory guidance.27  
Recent federal public charge rule changes dissuaded immigrant 
community members from seeking government help during fire and de-
energization emergencies out of fear doing so would endanger their 
citizenship application prospects.28  Even so, the CPUC has yet to fully 
outline a comprehensive order specifically addressing de-energization 
authority within the public health crisis context.29 
Consequently, broad IOU de-energization authority raises two 
critical questions: are utilities adhering to their legal duties to deliver 
safe and reliable power, and should the CPUC assert a more direct role 
over de-energization events because of their widespread impact on the 
public?30  This Note directly addresses those concerns.  Part II lays the 
legal groundwork for de-energization authority.  Part III elaborates on 
the aforementioned questions by specifically asking whether IOU de-
 
https://www.pge.com/en/about/newsroom/newsdetails/index.page?title=20200701_pge_eme
rges_from_chapter_11 (“[PG&E] announced today that [it] has emerged from Chapter 11[.]”). 
See PG&E Plea Agreement, supra note 10, at 1. See also MICHAEL L. RAMSEY, THE CAMP 
FIRE PUBLIC REPORT: A SUMMARY OF THE CAMP FIRE INVESTIGATION 82 (2020) 
[hereinafter CAMP FIRE REPORT] (“The fact that PG&E was using a 97-100 year old conductor 
for which they knew almost nothing is evidence of absolute indifference on the part of 
PG&E.”). Cause of Kincade Fire, supra note 14. 
 26. See CPUC DECISION 20-05-051, supra note 16, at 12-13; see also Sotolongo et al., 
supra note 2, at 6. 
 27. CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, JOINT MOTION FOR EMERGENCY ORDER REGARDING 
DE-ENERGIZATION PROTOCOLS DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC, RULEMAKING 18-12-
005, at 1, 17-23 (2018) [hereinafter JOINT MOTION FOR EMERGENCY ORDER]; see also Jackie 
Ward, Power Shut Off For Danville Residents Sheltering-In-Place For PG&E Fire 
Prevention Work, CBS SF BAYAREA (Apr. 16, 2020, 3:38 PM), 
https://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2020/04/16/coronavirus-power-shut-off-for-danville-
residents-sheltering-in-place-for-pge-fire-prevention-work/. 
 28. Public Charge, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/green-
card/green-card-processes-and-procedures/public-charge (last updated Sept. 22, 2020) 
(expanding public charge rule to include aliens who have received public benefits for more 
than twelve months within any thirty-six-month period). Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. New 
York, 140 S. Ct. 599 (2020) (granting DHS a stay on a preliminary injunction issued against 
the new rule change pending disposition of government’s appeal in the Second Circuit). 
 29. See CPUC DECISION 20-05-051, supra note 16, at 75 (acknowledging requests for 
PSPS guidance during the pandemic, but noting this decision does not address such requests); 
see also Electric Utility 2020 Planning for Public Safety Power Shutoffs (PSPS), CAL. PUB. 
UTILS. COMM’N, https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/general.aspx?id=6442465765 (last visited Jan. 6, 
2021) (directing the public to review each individual utility for their 2020 PSPS protocols 
during the pandemic). 
 30.  CPUC DECISION 20-05-051, supra note 16, at 2-12. 
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energization discretion: (1) threatens compliance with investment duties 
under PU Codes 451, 399 and 399.2; (2) incentivizes utilities to side-
step critical repairs to their electric facilities—investments synonymous 
with delivering safe and reliable power—while potentially gaining 
access to a new wildfire liability fund; and (3) disproportionately 
impacts socially and economically vulnerable communities.  Part IV 
analyzes these legal issues in further depth.  Part V provides a specific 
proposal for CPUC response—a recommendation squarely within its 
current de-energization rules, orders, and decisions.  Part VI concludes 
by recommending immediate action to ensure utilities place safety first, 
and consider equity when executing de-energization authority. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The California Constitution empowers the CPUC to regulate all 
public utilities subject to its jurisdiction.31  All private corporations 
controlling or managing the production, generation, transmission, or 
furnishing of heat, light, or power, whether directly or indirectly to or 
for the public, are public utilities subject to regulation by the California 
Legislature.32  Investor-owned utilities (IOUs) PG&E, SDG&E, SCE, 
and others operating within California are public utilities for purposes of 
state law.33  Through the CPUC, the Legislature regulates these IOUs.34  
Such regulatory power includes the CPUC authority to review utility 
executed de-energization—and ensuring PSPS remains a tool of last 
resort.35 
A. A Brief Overview of Our Electrical Infrastructure System 
Understanding the electrical infrastructure system is a prerequisite 
to analyzing de-energization authority and examining its impact on 
public safety.  Our electrical infrastructure breaks into three main 
categories: generation, transmission, and distribution.36  Generation 
involves the fuels and processes employed to produce electricity; 
transmission describes bulk electrical energy movement through 
transmission lines from a wholesale point of generation to substations; 
distribution entails the movement of electricity from a substation 
 
 31. CAL. CONST. art. XII. 
 32.  CAL. CONST. art. XII, § 3. 
 33. See id. 
 34. See CAL. CONST. art. XII. 
 35. See id. ESRB-8, supra note 16, at 4. CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, DECISION 19-05-
042 ADOPTING DE-ENERGIZATION (PUBLIC SAFETY POWER SHUT-OFF) GUIDELINES 3 
(PHASE 1 GUIDELINES) 68 (2019) [hereinafter CPUC DECISION 19-05-042] (de-energization 
is a “measure of last resort”). 
 36. K.K. DUVIVIER, ENERGY LAW BASICS 171 (2017). 
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through localized lines connecting directly to customers.37  Electrical 
infrastructure (the grid) embodies these complex and interconnecting 
facilities generating, transmitting, and distributing electricity.38 
Though similar in many characteristics, transmission and 
distribution lines differ on two points.  First, transmission lines channel 
higher-voltage electricity to multiple customers of wholesale markets, 
whereas distribution lines deliver power from substations directly to 
retail customers.39  Second, transmission lines generally carry electrical 
power much farther and often across state boundaries, but distribution 
lines largely stay within local areas.40  These critical differences 
delineate where federal and state jurisdictions apply.41 
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) presides over 
electricity sold at wholesale in interstate commerce, but states retain 
authority over retail sales to local customers.42  FERC oversees 
reliability standards of electricity sold in interstate commerce, yet the 
 
 37. See Electricity Explained, U.S. ENERGY & INFO. ADMIN. (Mar. 20, 2020), 
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/electricity/electricity-in-the-us.php (noting how the 
United States relies on varying sources of energy for generation of electricity including fossil 
fuels, nuclear energy and renewable energy sources, where “most electricity is generated with 
steam turbines” using those energy resources). DUVIVIER, supra note 36, at 171 (“In its 
broadest sense, FERC defines a transmission line as one moving bulk energy products from a 
wholesale point of production or generation to a point where it can be converted to be 
delivered for retail sale to customers.”). Id. (“Distribution lines bring the power from the 
substation to end users of electricity.”). 
 38. DUVIVIER, supra note 36, at 100 (“In summary, most modern electricity production 
in the United States passes through three phases: (1) Generation, (2) Transmission, and (3) 
Distribution.”). Id. at 172 (“The term ‘grid’ to describe the collection of lines throughout the 
United States suggests more order than there is in reality.”). 
 39. Id. at 171. 
 40. Id. at 172 (“[A] fundamental trait of a transmission line is that it is intended to carry 
power over distances. These distances will vary. Some transmission lines remain completely 
within a single state and others cross state lines.”). Id. at 171. See also Transmission Lines vs. 
Distribution Power Lines, PG&E, https://www.pge.com/en_US/safety/yard-
safety/powerlines-and-trees/transmission-vs-distribution-power-lines.page (last visited Mar. 
7, 2021) (noting how transmission lines “transport bulk electricity at high voltages ranging 
from 60 kV-500kV” whereas distribution lines “[d]eliver electricity to neighborhoods and 
communities over a shorter distance than transmission lines . . . [and serve as] the final stage 
of electricity to homes and businesses.”). 
 41. What FERC Does, FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, https://www.ferc.gov/about/what-
ferc/what-ferc-does (last visited Jan. 6, 2021) (“The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 
or FERC, is an independent agency that regulates the interstate transmission of electricity, 
natural gas, and oil . . . [FERC] [r]egulates the transmission and wholesale sales of electricity 
in interstate commerce” but “[m]any areas outside of FERC’s jurisdictional responsibility are 
dealt with by State Public Utility Commissions” including “[r]egulation of retail electricity 
and natural gas sales to consumers”). 
 42. 16 U.S.C. § 824(a)-(b) (2015) (extending federal regulatory power over electricity to 
the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce, and the sale of electric energy at 
wholesale in interstate commerce). What FERC Does, supra note 41 (noting how FERC does 
not regulate retail electricity sales to customers, reliability problems related to local 
distribution facilities, and tree trimmings near local distribution lines in residential areas). 
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Federal Power Act—which created FERC—makes no mention of safety 
standards for delivering the same electrical power.43  FERC jurisdiction 
over the electric power industry remains limited and largely concerns the 
transmission of electrical energy flowing through interstate commerce, 
and setting rates conforming to just and reasonable standards.44  In 
contrast, California prioritizes safety and reliability when regulating 
utilities generating, transmitting, and distributing electrical power within 
state boundaries.45 
B. De-Energization Legal Authority 
The absence of a federal safety power mandate lends to our focused 
discussion on de-energization at the state and local level.  Specifically, 
our analysis centers on how the CPUC steps in to address a critical 
regulatory safety gap, and thus retains broad regulatory authority over 
utilities—including reviewing de-energization for reasonableness and 
ensuring it remains as a tool of last resort.46  California Public Utilities 
Codes 451, 399, and 399.2 take center stage in our discussion because 
these provisions ground PSPS authority, outline IOU requirements, and 
highlight CPUC responsibilities when ensuring utilities furnish electric 
service to promote the health and safety of the public. 
1. California Public Utilities Code § 451 
The CPUC retains authority to “fix rates, establish rules, examine 
records, issue [subpoenas] . . . and prescribe a uniform system of 
accounts for utilities subject to its jurisdiction.”47  Within this same 
oversight power, the CPUC permits IOUs to execute a Power Shut-Off 
Plan when extreme weather conditions pose an increased fire risk to 
public safety.48  But the ultimate decision to de-energize falls at the 
 
 43. Id. 
 44. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE FEDERAL POWER ACT 
1-2 (2020). 
 45. See CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODES § 451 (1977); CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 399.2 (2001). 
 46. See generally CAL. CONST. art. XII, §§ 2-6. 
 47. CAL. CONST. art. XII, § 6. 
 48. ESRB-8, supra note 16, at 8 (“Under PU Code Sections 451 and 399.2(a), electric 
IOUs have the authority to shut off power in order to protect public safety.”). See generally 
CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, DECISION DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE SAN DIEGO GAS & 
ELECTRIC COMPANY’S APPLICATION TO SHUT OFF POWER DURING PERIODS OF HIGH 
DANGER, DECISION 09-09-030 69 (2009) [hereinafter CPUC DECISION 09-09-030] (“SDG&E 
has authority under §§ 451 and 399.2(a) to shut off power in emergency situations when 
necessary to protect public safety. Any decision by SDG&E to shut off power may be 
reviewed by the Commission pursuant to its broad jurisdiction regarding the safety of public 
utility operations and facilities.”). 
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discretion of the utility—not the CPUC.49  De-energization serves as a 
critical tool of last resort when hazardous weather conditions merit 
cutting off electrical power, but remains an impermissible general 
wildfire response.50 
California PU Code 451 is of critical importance here because it 
directs: (1) every public utility to provide and maintain “adequate, 
efficient, just, and reasonable service” as (2) “necessary to promote the 
safety, health, comfort, and convenience of its patrons, employees, and 
the public.”51  In essence, PU Code 451 requires IOUs to deliver electric 
service for promoting the safety of the public.52  However, this provision 
alone does not supply the legal basis for IOU de-energization authority.  
PU Code 451 works in conjunction with PU Code 399.2, a provision 
laying out the utility mandate to operate infrastructure and deliver 
electricity in a safe and reliable manner.53 
2. California Public Utilities Code § 399.2 
PU Code 399.2 teases out utility obligations under PU Code 451 
(promoting public safety) by ordering electric providers to: (1) operate 
electric distribution lines in a “safe, reliable, efficient, and cost-effective 
manner;” (2) control and maintain utility-owned electric distribution 
grids, and; (3) manage electric distribution grids in service territories 
consistent with Section 330.54  PU 399.2 serves a distinct, 
complementary function to PU 451: it reinforces reliable electric service 
as a critical state interest, but equally mandates reasonable infrastructure 
investments—a point elaborated later in this discussion.55  
 
 49.  See ESRB-8, supra note 16, at 8 (“We expect an IOU to use its best judgment on a 
case-by-case basis to determine whether de-energization is needed for public safety.”). 
 50.  See generally CPUC Takes Action, supra note 23. 
 51. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 451 (1977) (“Every public utility shall furnish and 
maintain such adequate, efficient, just, and reasonable service, instrumentalities, equipment, 
and facilities . . . as are necessary to promote the safety, health, comfort, and convenience of 
its patrons, employees, and the public.”). 
 52. Id.; see also Catherine J.K. Sandoval, Safe, Reliable Service at Just and Reasonable 
Rates: Priorities, Challenges, and Opportunities, STAN. L. SCH. 4 (Apr. 25, 2013), 
https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUC_Public_Website/Content/About_Us/Organiz
ation/Commissioners/Catherine_Sandoval/Stanford_2013_Presentation.pdf. 
 53. See ESRB-8, supra note 16, at 2. 
 54.  CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 399.2(a)-(b) (2001) (“It is the policy of this state, and the 
intent of the Legislature, to reaffirm that each electrical corporation shall continue to operate 
its electric distribution grid in its service territory and shall do so in a safe, reliable, efficient, 
and cost-effective manner.”). 
 55.  CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 399.2(c) (2001) (“In carrying out the purposes of this 
section, each electrical corporation shall continue to make reasonable investments in its 
electric distribution grid.”). See also Reliable Electric Service Investments Act, CAL. PUB. 
UTILS. CODE § 399 (2001) (“The Legislature further finds and declares that in order to ensure 
that the citizens of this state continue to receive safe, reliable, affordable, and environmentally 
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Fundamentally, PU Code 399.2 directs utilities to operate electrical 
distribution grids within their service territories in a safe and reliable 
manner.56 
Herein lies de-energization.  Cutting electric power appears 
antithetical to providing reliable service; however, utilities must deliver 
power safely.  PU Code 451 (promoting public safety) demands every 
public utility must: “furnish and maintain such adequate, efficient, just, 
and reasonable service, instrumentalities, equipment, and facilities . . . 
as are necessary to promote the safety, health, comfort, and convenience 
of its patrons, employees, and the public.”57  In turn, PU Code 399.2 
holds utilities accountable for the safe and reliable operation of their 
electrical infrastructure.58  The end result: when weather phenomenon 
acutely threatens safe delivery of reliable power, thus risking the public, 
then an IOU stands empowered to shut off electricity to affected areas 
because it must operate in a safe manner.59  Together, these codes form 
the basis of de-energization authority. 
3. California Public Utilities Code § 330 
Though not included in the de-energization legal framework, 
California PU Code 330 remains relevant in our discussion for two brief 
reasons.  The provision emphasizes safe and reliable power under PU 
Codes 451 (promoting public safety) and 399.2 (safe and reliable 
operation) by assigning the CPUC and electric utilities additional duties 
concerning safety, reliability, inspection, and maintenance of electric 
transmission and distribution systems.60 
First, PU Code 330 follows the same theme of safe energy 
reliability: “[r]eliable electric service is of utmost importance to the 
safety, health, and welfare of the state’s citizenry.”61  PU Code 330 
underscores the mandates highlighted in PU Codes 451 (promoting 
public safety) and 399.2 (safe and reliable operation) and further grounds 
CPUC authority to protect public safety.62  Unlike FERC, the CPUC 
 
sustainable electric service, it is essential that prudent investments continue to be made [to] 
protect the integrity of the electric distribution grid [and to] ensure an adequately sized and 
trained utility workforce[.]”). 
 56. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 399.2 (2001). 
 57. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 451 (1977). 
 58. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 399.2 (a)(1)(2001); see also ESRB-8, supra 16, at 8 
(“Under PU Code Sections 451 and 399.2(a), electric IOUs have authority to shut off power 
in order to protect public safety.”). 
 59.  Id.; see also CPUC DECISION 09-09-030, supra note 48, at 61-62; CPUC DECISION 
12-04-024, supra note 16, at 3-4; ESRB-8, supra note 16, at 2. 
 60.  CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 330(f)-(i) (2001). 
 61. Id. 
 62. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 330(g) (2001). 
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goes beyond federal reliability requirements by specifically addressing 
safety standards for electric power service.63  This distinction remains 
important because the federal authority does not inhibit the CPUC from 
taking necessary action when protecting public safety, regulating 
electrical infrastructure operation, and utility delivery of electric service 
at the local level.64  Moreover, the CPUC wields broad jurisdiction over 
formulating and revisiting de-energization rules, orders, and 
requirements—a power this discussion highlights and recommends 
exercising to ensure utilities do not resort to de-energization in lieu of 
postponing critical infrastructure repairs.65 
Second—along with PU Code 399.2 (safe and reliable operation)—
PU Code 330 reinforces how reliable delivery of electricity depends on 
diligent inspection and maintenance of electric transmission and 
distribution lines.66  In doing so, PU Code 330 encourages the CPUC to 
work with the California Independent System Operator (CAISO)—the 
state grid operator—in setting standards for those inspections, 
maintenance, and repairs.67  Yet, utilities like PG&E remain obligated to 
provide safe and reliable electric power at “just and reasonable rates,”68  
in addition to performing conscientious inspections and maintaining 
their electrical facilities.69  In doing so, utilities retain a protected 
opportunity to receive a fair return on investment in their electrical 
infrastructure.70  This compromise exemplifies a regulatory compact 
where a utility receives a government-backed monopoly and a protected 
fair return opportunity in exchange for state regulation of rates, profits, 
and delivery of safe and reliable power to the public.71 
 
 63. What FERC Does, supra note 41. 
 64. See id. 
 65. See CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 330 (2001); see also ESRB-8, supra note 16, at 8 (“The 
decision to shut off power may be reviewed by the Commission pursuant to its broad 
jurisdiction over public safety and utility operations.”). 
 66. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 330(i) (2001). 
 67. Id. 
 68. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 451 (1977); see Sandoval, supra note 52. 
 69. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 330(i) (2001). 
 70. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 399.2(c) (2001) (outlining how each electrical corporation 
enjoys a reasonable opportunity to fully recover from all of its customers all “reasonable 
investments in its electric distribution grid,” “reasonable return[s]” on those investments, 
and “reasonable costs to operate its electric distribution grid.”). See generally Maryam 
Ghadessi & Marzia Zafar, An Introduction to Utility Cost of Capital, CAL. PUB. UTILS. 




 71. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 399.2(a)-(b). See Cagle, supra note 8 (“The construction 
of [the] private utility system was ‘a grand bargain,’ ”  says University of California, Santa 
Barbara, political science professor Leah Stokes. “They said, ‘we want to be private 
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C. IOU Duties Under California Public Utilities Codes § 451, § 399, 
and § 399.2 
Operating collectively, PU Codes 451, 399 and 399.2 mandate 
utilities: (1) promote public safety by (2) controlling, maintaining and 
diligently investing in electric infrastructure (3) through safe and reliable 
operation when delivering electric service to the public.72  PU Codes 451 
and 399.2 mandate safe and reliable power flowing from utilities to 
customers.73  PU Code 330 encourages the CPUC to set diligent 
inspection and maintenance standards of electric transmission and 
distribution lines.74  But another critical legal responsibility exists: the 
utility obligation to reasonably invest in its own electrical infrastructure 
as outlined in PU Code 399.2(c).75  The pivotal question presented in this 
discussion centers on whether de-energization when left to IOU 
discretion undermines mandates to reasonably invest in utility-owned 
infrastructure, and, if so, how the CPUC should step in with an 
infrastructure investment inquiry to ensure de-energization does not 
become a practical general wildfire response.  Thus, PU Code 399.2(c) 
raises two relevant points. 
On the first point, IOUs must provide safe and reliable power but 
shall do so in conjunction with diligent investments in their electrical 
infrastructure.76  When extreme weather conditions arise or persist, IOUs 
can de-energize their local lines to protect public safety.77  The CPUC 
makes no distinction between utility authority to shut off distribution 
lines versus transmission lines, and CAISO—the state power grid 
operator—maintains how “[u]tilities may de-energize both distribution 
and high-voltage transmission lines as needed.”78  Nevertheless, de-
energization does not negate the responsibility to maintain electrical 
 
monopolies, we have to have a guaranteed market to make our product cheaper because we 
have all these fixed costs. So government said okay, if you’re a monopoly, we have to regulate 
you.[’] ” ) . DUVIVIER, supra note 36, at 57 (“In this newly established arrangement, often 
called the ‘regulatory compact,’ utility companies would receive a government-backed 
monopoly, with guaranteed territories for selling their products. In exchange, the government 
would be able to regulate the rates and profits of the regulated utilities.”). 
 72. CAL. PUB. UTILS.CODE §§ 451 (1977); CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE §§ 399, 399.2 (2001). 
 73. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 451; CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 399.2 (2001). 
 74. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 330 (2001). 
 75. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 399.2(c) (2001). 
 76. See CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 451 (1977); CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE §§ 399, 399.2(c) 
(2001). 
 77. ESRB-8, supra note 16, at 8. 
 78. See FACT SHEET: PUBLIC SAFETY POWER SHUTOFF (PSPS) PROGRAM, CAL. INDEP. 
SYS. OPERATOR (2020). ESRB-8, supra note 16, at 8-9 (emphasizing only how “[u]nder PU 
Code Sections 451 and 399.2(a), electric IOUs have the authority to shut off power in order 
to protect public safety[,]” and how “[d]e-energization of electric facilities could save lives, 
protect property, and prevent fires.”). 
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facilities, ensure an adequately sized and trained workforce, and employ 
reasonable investments in utility-owned electrical infrastructure.79  Such 
infrastructure investments logically include repairing and replacing 
faulty or excessively old facilities.80  Certainly, operating electrical 
infrastructure well beyond life expectancy cannot constitute delivering 
safe and reliable power.81 
Second, for PG&E, where operational mismanagement and 
infrastructure failures resulted in significant liability and loss of life, de-
energization presents a dangerous opportunity for abuse.82  Unfettered 
de-energization discretion potentially delays repairing and replacing 
electrical facilities, thus risking public safety—conduct contravening 
utility obligations to deliver safe and reliable power through a prudently 
maintained energy infrastructure.83  PG&E points to climate change and 
unpredictable weather phenomena as equal culprits contributing to 
wildfire dangers.84  The utility argues PSPS is the only certain way to 
prevent ignition during high wind weather events.85 
D. Climate Change Challenges, De-Energization and Utility 
Obligations 
Certainly, extreme weather conditions exacerbate wildfire dangers.  
Prolonged summer heatwaves increase dry vegetation growing 
alongside electrical infrastructure, consequently leaving electrical 
facilities at the mercy of high winds flowing onshore.86  Such 
 
 79. See CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 451 (1977); CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE §§ 399, 399.2(c) 
(2001). 
 80. See CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 399.2 (2001). 
 81. See CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 451 (1977); CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE §§ 399, 399.2(c) 
(2001). See also CAMP FIRE REPORT, supra note 25, at 84 (“During the post Camp Fire 
inspections, worn C hooks and worn hanger holes were found throughout the PG&E Overhead 
Transmission System. Despite the knowledge C hooks and hanger holes wear over time and 
despite the knowledge of the danger inherent in the failure of a C hook or hanger hole, the 
evidence clearly established nobody in PG&E was inspecting C hooks and hanger holes.”). 
 82. CAMP FIRE REPORT, supra note 25, at 82-87. 
 83. See CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 451 (1977); CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE §§ 399, 399.2(c) 
(2001). 
 84. Kavya Balaraman, PG&E CEO promises ‘shorter, fewer’ shut-offs continuing for the 
next 5 years, UTIL. DIVE (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/pge-ceo-shut-
offs-shorter-fewer-five-years/569466/. 
 85. PG&E, 2020 WILDFIRE MITIGATION PLAN REPORT 4-1 (2020) [hereinafter PG&E 
2020 WMP REPORT]. 
 86. See CPUC DECISION 19-05-042, supra note 35, at 3 (“After several years of drought, 
changing weather patterns, extreme high heat, ferocious winds, and low humidity, among 
other factors, the 2018 fire season in California was the most destructive on record. July 2018 
was the hottest month on record in California.”); Tim Arango et al., 5 Lessons We Learned 
from the California Wildfires in 2019, NY TIMES (Sept. 9, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/04/us/fires-california.html. 
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circumstances translate into a direct cause and effect relationship where 
“[d]rier plants catch fire more easily,” thus sparking massive fire events; 
here, de-energization aids as a useful and flexible tool adaptable to such 
wildfire emergencies.87 
CPUC Rules (including General Order 95) specifically address the 
danger live wires present when coming into contact with vegetation.88  
GO 95 requires utilities to perform year-round clearance of vegetation 
coming within eighteen inches of power lines and vegetation coming 
within four feet of high voltage lines in areas the CPUC designates as a 
High Fire-Threat District (HFTD).89  Still, for California, drought 
conditions are increasing drier vegetation and more areas are being 
classified as a HFTD.90  For PG&E, over half of its service territory lies 
within HFTD areas.91 
In late 2020, the state endured one of the most destructive fire 
seasons with an estimated 4.2 million acres burned; the August Complex 
currently stands as the largest in modern California history at one million 
acres, and five out of the six largest California fires recorded occurred 
this past year.92  In Fresno County, the Creek Fire—cited as the largest 
single wildfire in state history—destroyed approximately $250 million 
worth of homes.93  While the August Complex resulted from lightning 
and the Creek Fire remains under investigation,94 the impetus remains 
the same: deteriorating weather conditions are leaving dry brush at the 
 
 87. Arango et al., supra note 86; see also ESRB-8, supra note 16, at 8. 
 88. See CPUC DECISION 19-05-042, supra note 35, at 4. CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, 
RULES FOR OVERHEAD ELECTRIC LINE CONSTRUCTION GENERAL ORDER NO. 95 III-19 
(2018) [hereinafter GO 95] (explaining Rule 35 vegetation management guidelines and 
establishing necessary and reasonable clearances minimums for all overheard electrical 
supply facilities). 
 89. GO 95, supra note 88, at III-19, III-24-25. Laws and Regulations GO 95, PG&E, 
https://www.pge.com/en_US/safety/yard-safety/powerlines-and-trees/laws-
andregulations.page#:~:text=General%20Order%2095%2C%20issued%20by,designated%2
0High%20Fire%2DThreat%20Districts (last visited Jan. 4, 2021). 
 90. See PG&E 2020 WMP REPORT, supra note 85, at 1-2. 
 91. Id. (“Approximately 5,500 line-miles of electric transmission and 25,500 line-miles 
of distribution assets lie within these HFTDs.”). 
 92.  Jeff Masters, Reviewing the horrid global 2020 wildfire season, YALE CLIMATE 
CONNECTIONS (Jan. 4, 2021), https://yaleclimateconnections.org/2021/01/reviewing-the-
horrid-global-2020-wildfire-season/ (highlighting the August Complex Fires as the largest in 
California state history at a size of 1.03 million acres). 
 93. Manuela Tobias, Creek Fire is a $500 million-plus mystery. How investigators plan 
to solve the case, FRESNO BEE (Dec. 31, 2020, 9:24 AM), 
https://www.fresnobee.com/news/california/fires/article248158005.html (noting the Creek 
Fire as the single largest in California history). 
 94.  August Complex: Incident Information, INCIWEB, 
https://inciweb.nwcg.gov/incident/6983/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2021). Tobias, supra note 93 
(“Federal and state officials declined to give details on the cause of the Creek Fire, citing an 
ongoing federal investigation.”). 
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mercy of ignition sources.95  As PG&E points out, even a “perfectly 
sound [electrical] system with everything working well” is not immune 
to climate change; even when vegetation management adheres to CPUC 
rules excessive wind can carry debris onto live electrical lines.96  PG&E 
faces a particularly dangerous situation because the utility furnishes 
power to millions of Californians dispersed over a vast service territory 
“uniquely exposed to climate impacts because of its geography and 
vegetation.”97 
Nevertheless, climate change complications fail as a viable defense 
for PG&E on two points.  First, SDG&E exemplifies a multi-faceted 
approach when addressing wildfire dangers by executing broad 
infrastructure upgrades in conjunction with localized, small-scale de-
energization events.98  Even former PG&E CEO Bill Johnson noted how 
SDG&E employs de-energization events in “a very narrow surgical 
way.”99  SDG&E improved mitigation efforts following its own fatal 
liabilities during the 2007 wildfire season—but PG&E did not.100  
Instead, investigations into the Camp Fire revealed 100-year old PG&E 
electrical equipment ignited the deadly blaze.101  In its Camp Fire Report, 
the Butte County District Attorney explicitly noted how PG&E 
discovered and possessed detailed information confirming the 
deteriorated state of its electrical infrastructure, yet failed to sufficiently 
inspect its electrical equipment used for restraining dangerous overhead 
transmission lines in place.102 
Second, extreme weather phenomenon does not abrogate utility 
duties.  Rather, such phenomenon reinforces the legal duties of due 
 
 95. Masters, supra note 92 (explaining how a “once-in-50-year” weather event along 
with heat and drought contributed to a disastrous 2020 California Wildfire Season). 
 96.  Balaraman, supra note 84. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See Claire Trageser, PG&E Blasted For Not Being More Like SDG&E In Managing 
Power Shutoffs, But Is The Comparison Fair?, KPBS (Oct. 24, 2019), 
https://www.kpbs.org/news/2019/oct/24/pge-blasted-not-being-more-sdge-managing-power-
shu/ (noting how SDG&E made changes only after power lines ignited fires in 2007 which 
burned down hundreds of homes and killed two people). 
 99. Senate Committee Wildfire Hearing, supra note 6, at 1:00:54. 
 100. See CAMP FIRE REPORT, supra note 25, at 84. 
 101. Id. at 83-84. 
 102. Id. (“In 2018 the discovery of keyhole wear on hanger plates on the par transmission 
line caused enough concern that the Transmission Line Supervisor sent the plates to the PG&E 
lab for analysis and evaluation. Unlike in 1987, in 2018 the lab actually did a metallurgical 
evaluation. A PG&E lab scientist, with a PhD in Material Science and Engineering, used the 
available data to opine the keyhole wear was occurring at a rate of .007 inches per year. Based 
on average wear rate, the PG&E lab scientist determined the useful life of those hanger plates 
to be between 97 and 100 years old. PG&E now had scientific confirmation of the body-on-
body wear caused by the constant movement of the C hooks within the hanger holes and had 
an estimate of average wear per year. Nothing was done.”). 
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diligence in safely operating and maintaining electrical infrastructure—
including inspecting, repairing and replacing facilities at risk—either 
because of the weather events themselves or the deteriorated status of 
the infrastructure.103  Climate change exacerbates drier conditions and 
vegetation conducive for devastating wildfires; wind presents the danger 
of carrying such debris onto live lines, but the choice to operate electrical 
infrastructure without the proper upgrades, repairs or replacement falls 
with the utility alone.104 
Utility decisions of this nature endanger property, the public and 
contravene obligations under PU Codes 451 (promoting public safety), 
399 (prudent infrastructure investments), and 399.2 (safe and reliable 
operation).105  The Camp Fire devastation stands as a notable example 
of the deadly choice resulting from operating dangerously decaying 
infrastructure.  As the CPUC notes: “[e]lectrical utility infrastructure has 
historically been responsible for less than ten percent of reported 
wildfires; however, fires attributed to power lines comprise roughly half 
of the most destructive fires in California history.”106 
Herein lies the danger of broad de-energization discretion: utilities 
stand emboldened in manipulating PSPS to address imminent wildfire 
dangers—arguing public safety necessitated those power shutoffs—all 
while postponing or forfeiting their legal duty to prudently invest in their 
electrical infrastructure.  The 2019 PSPS shutoffs affecting millions of 
customers exemplify the extent utilities will go to avoid further 
catastrophic liabilities in the name of public safety.107  The central thesis 
of our discussion focuses on whether utilities like PG&E are at increased 
risk for abusing de-energization authority as a general wildfire response 
to stave off further wildfire incidents connected to its equipment in lieu 
 
 103.  See generally CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 399.2(a)-(c) (2001). 
 104. CAMP FIRE REPORT, supra note 25, at 84 (“Despite the efforts of PG&E personnel 
to distance the company from the ‘Run to Failure’ model, the evidence clearly establishes 
quite the opposite. PG&E had knowledge of the potential consequences of failure of the nearly 
100-year-old C hooks, yet PG&E continued its policy of ‘Run to Failure[.]’ ” ). Cagle, supra 
note 8. 
 105.  CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 451 (1977); CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE §§ 399, 399.2(c) 
(2001). 
 106. Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) / De-Energization, CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, 
https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/deenergization/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2021). 
 107.  Press Release, Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, CPUC to Examine Recent Utility PSPS 
Events and Consider Enforcement Actions (Nov. 13, 2019), 
https://yubanet.com/california/cpuc-to-examine-recent-utility-psps-events-and-consider-
enforcement-actions/ [hereinafter CPUC to Examine Recent Utility PSPS Events] (comments 
by PUC Commissioner Genevieve Shiroma) (“It is important for the CPUC to determine if 
the utilities complied with using [PSPS] as a last resort, and to collect the knowledge gained 
towards any revisions needed for next year[.]”). See also SED 2019 PSPS REPORT, supra note 
1, at 2-3. 
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of costly infrastructure repairs.108  The next question then evaluates 
whether directing an IOU to repair or replace utility-owned facilities 
violates its constitutional right to just compensation. 
E. The Federal Mandate: A Fair Return on Investment 
Fair returns on utility investment is a complex area directly 
implicating IOU de-energization authority in three ways: (1) IOUs are 
entitled to a fair return on infrastructure investment,109 (2) the CPUC 
must balance just compensation and the statutory requirement for just 
and reasonable rates under PU Code 451 with the public interest of 
receiving safe and reliable power,110 and (3) broad de-energization 
discretion incentivizes financially distressed entities like PG&E to 
postpone or sidestep critical investments.  Together, these factors pose 
significant challenges when weighing public safety risks and the utility 
duty to furnish safe and reliable power. 
First, IOUs require a sufficient return to attract investor capital 
while keeping costs low for ratepayers.111  The U.S. Constitution entitles 
public utilities to an opportunity for earning a fair return on investment 
when providing services to the public.112  The right does not guarantee a 
fair return, but protects the ability to gain one.113  The return should be 
sufficient to instill confidence regarding the financial stability of the 
utility, but ought to reflect the return on investment comparable to other 
entities sharing similar risks.114  Denying a public utility the chance to 
earn a fair return raises serious constitutional issues of just 
 
 108. See CAMP FIRE REPORT, supra note 25, at 84; Cause of Kincade Fire, supra note 14. 
 109. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1876) (“When, therefore, one devotes his 
property to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an 
interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good, to 
the extent of the interest he has thus created.”). See generally L.A. Gas & Elec. Corp. v. R.R. 
Comm’n of Cal., 289 U.S. 287 (1933) (explaining that rate regulation cannot be confiscatory). 
 110. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODES § 451 (1977) (obligating utilities to provide just and 
reasonable service as necessary to promote public safety). 
 111. Ghadessi & Zafar, supra note 70, at 3. 
 112. See generally L.A. Gas & Elec. Corp., 289 U.S. at 305-06 (“[T]he judicial function 
does not go beyond the decision of the constitutional question. That question is whether the 
rates as fixed are confiscatory . . . [and] that what the complainant is entitled to demand, in 
order it may have ‘just compensation,’ is ‘a fair return upon the reasonable value of the 
property at the time it is being used for the public.’ ” ). 
 113. Id. at 3-4. 
 114. Id. at 3 (citing Bluefield Water Works & Improv. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of W. 
Va., 262 U.S. 679 (1923)) (“The return should be reasonably sufficient to assure confidence 
in the financial soundness of the utility, and should be adequate, under efficient and 
economical management, to maintain and support its credit and enable it to raise money 
necessary for the proper discharge of its public duties.”). Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. 
Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944) (“[T]he return to the equity owner should be commensurate 
with returns on investments in other enterprises having corresponding risks.”). 
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compensation—a due process violation.115  Inquiries into a fair return 
require a regulator to evaluate all relevant facts—an analysis not 
amenable to simplified formulas or calculations.116  For purposes of this 
discussion, we need only remember an IOU’s constitutional right to earn 
a fair return on investment.117 
Second, an IOU’s protected right to seek a fair return complicates 
the CPUC’s duty to the public.  PU Code 451 requires utilities to 
maintain their equipment and facilities as necessary to promote the 
safety, health, and convenience of the public.118  Section 399.2(c) 
requires utilities to reasonably invest in their electrical distribution grids, 
facilities, and operations.119  PU Code 399 guarantees utilities recover 
from their customers all reasonable investments in their facilities and 
operations reasonably necessary to carry out service to customers.120  
Common sense informs us IOUs will not repair or replace owned 
facilities when investment returns cannot be expected: “[i]nvestors 
expect to earn a return on their capital.”121  Thus, the CPUC walks a 
delicate line of balancing competing interests: prioritizing ratepayer 
access to safe and reliable power at just and reasonable rates on the one 
hand, while fulfilling a constitutional mandate of permitting utilities an 
opportunity to recover a fair investment return on the other.122 
Third, broad de-energization discretion frustrates juggling IOU just 
compensation and the public interest of receiving safe and reliable 
service.  At one end, de-energization serves its narrow legitimate 
function as a vital tool of last resort.123  IOUs may exercise de-
energization when anticipating dangerous weather conditions posing 
 
 115. See L.A. Gas & Elec. Corp., 289 U.S. 287 (1933). 
 116.  Id. at 306. 
 117. Ghadessi & Zafar, supra note 70, at 3-4 (citing Bluefield, 262 U.S. 679) (“The legal 
standard for setting a fair rate of return has been established by the United States Supreme 
Court in the Bluefield and Hope decisions. That decision states that a public utility should be 
provided an opportunity to earn a return necessary for it to provide utility service.”). See also 
L.A. Gas & Electric Corp, 289 U.S. at 304-306 (“We have emphasized the distinctive function 
of the Court . . . to enforce constitutional rights . . . [t]his Court has repeatedly held that the 
basis of calculation is the fair value of the property, that is, that what the complainant is 
entitled to demand, in order that it may have ‘just compensation,’ is ‘a fair return upon the 
reasonable value of the property at the time it is being used for the public.’ ” ). 
 118. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 451 (1977). 
 119. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 399.2(c)(1) (2001). 
 120. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 399.2(d) (2001) (“For purposes of this section, the term 
‘electric distribution grid’ means those facilities owned or operated by an electrical 
corporation that are not under the control of the Independent System Operator and that are 
used to transmit, deliver, or furnish electricity for light, heat, or power.”). 
 121. Ghadessi & Zafar, supra note 70, at 3. 
 122. Id. (“The [CPUC] has the responsibility to authorize a return high enough to attract 
[investor] capital and low enough to minimize [ratepayer] costs.”). 
 123. See ESRB-8, supra note 16, at 2-3. 
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increased fire dangers, but the CPUC retains review power when 
evaluating shutoff decisions, notice, and mitigation requirements.124  At 
the other end, broad IOU de-energization discretion endangers the public 
by swallowing up reasonable investment mandates in utility facilities.  
Infrastructure investments remain necessary for providing safe and 
reliable power to consumers.125 
F. A Comparative Look at SDG&E and PG&E 
SDG&E exemplifies wildfire mitigation efforts integrating de-
energization with infrastructure repairs and upgrades.126  SDG&E 
committed $1.5 billion to wildfire preparation, including relocating 
power lines underground and constructing smaller electrical grids for 
executing de-energization events at a localized level.127  In contrast, 
PG&E’s 2019 Wildfire Safety Plan (WSP) expands PSPS from 7,000 
circuit miles of targeted distribution lines to over 25,000 miles and 
potential transmission line de-energization from 370 circuit miles to over 
5,500.128  Yet, PG&E intended to only repair or replace 150 circuit miles 
of its electrical infrastructure by the end of 2019, another 600 circuit 
miles each year from 2020 through 2022, and complete 7,100 within ten 
years.129 
PG&E alleges that a low supply of required materials and trained 
personnel impede the completion of its infrastructure inspection and 
corrective work on a faster timeline.130  Those circumstances potentially 
violate PU Code 399 because PG&E must maintain sufficient resources 
and an adequately sized and trained workforce for safe and reliable 
infrastructure operation; such failures endanger de-energization 
becoming a general wildfire response in lieu of supply and workforce 
failures.131 
 
 124. Id. at 2. 
 125. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 399.2(a) (2001). 
 126. See generally CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N SAFETY & ENFORCEMENT DIVISION, 
REVIEW OF SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY DECEMBER 2017 DE-ENERGIZATION 
EVENTS (2018); see also Trageser, supra note 98. 
 127. Trageser, supra note 98. 
 128. PG&E, PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY AMENDED 2019 WILDFIRE SAFETY 
PLAN 96 (2019), https://www.pge.com/pge_global/common/pdfs/safety/emergency-
preparedness/natural-disaster/wildfires/Wildfire-Safety-Plan.pdf [hereinafter PG&E 2019 
WILDFIRE SAFETY PLAN]. 
 129. Id. at 63. 
 130. Id. at 55. 
 131. Id. See also CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 399 (2001) (“[I]n order to ensure that the 
citizens of this state continue to receive safe [and] reliable . . . electric service, it is essential 
that prudent investments continue to be made in all of the following areas [including] . . . an 
adequately sized and trained utility workforce.”). 
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In its 2020 Wildfire Mitigation Plan, PG&E states it completed 
system hardening of overhead distribution lines in High Fire-Threat 
Districts for 171 miles, plans to target 241 miles in 2020, and complete 
a total of 7,100 miles of hardening over the next twelve to fourteen years; 
for 2021, PG&E aims to harden 180 miles of higher risk overhead 
facilities—though that number is a drop from its 2020 mileage target.132  
The utility also explains how it anticipates reducing PSPS impact over 
the next ten years through different fire risk assessment tools but leaves 
open the possibility of increased de-energization based on climate 
models indicating a higher probability of more frequent fire weather 
conditions.133  Still, the miles targeted for system hardening pale in 
comparison to those mentioned for de-energization in the 2019 PG&E 
WSP.134 
Of course, simply comparing PG&E to SDG&E then concluding 
why the former should emulate the latter ignores key differences 
between the two utilities.  The PG&E service area of 70,000 square miles 
dwarfs SDG&E’s 4,100 square miles; SDG&E falls at a quarter of 
PG&E’s 16 million total customer base, and PG&E service territory 
includes denser tree and human population, thus increasing fire hazards 
and wildfire mitigation costs.135  Nonetheless, PG&E’s financial 
dilemma, its extensive liability to wildfire victims, and its continuously 
decaying infrastructure furnishing electricity to millions of Californians 
leaves de-energization as the tool for wildfire mitigation.136  The CPUC 
forbids de-energization as a liability reducing method: 
[T]he utilities should continue to strengthen their infrastructure to 
minimize the need for  and size of de-energization events.  Under no 
circumstances may the utilities employ de- energization solely as a 
means of reducing their own liability risk from utility- infrastructure 
wildfire ignitions, and the utilities must be able to justify why de-
 
 132. PG&E, PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY UPDATED 2020 WILDFIRE 
MITIGATION PLAN REPORT 3, 7 (2020) [hereinafter UPDATED 2020 WMP REPORT] 
(explaining system hardening as replacing bare overhead conductors by eliminating the line 
entirely, undergrounding or replacing with covered conductor and stronger poles); see also 
PG&E, PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY 2021 WILDFIRE MITIGATION PLAN REPORT 
558 (2021) [hereinafter PG&E 2021 WMP REPORT]. 
 133. Id. at 8-18, 4-27 (citing the need to de-energize some transmission and distribution 
lines to reduce the risk of catastrophic wildfires, but also efforts to reduce PSPS impact).   
 134. Compare PG&E 2019 WILDFIRE SAFETY PLAN, supra note 128, at 5 (detailing how 
in 2019, PG&E intends to complete 150 miles of system hardening in high-fire threat 
districts), with UPDATED 2020 WMP REPORT, supra note 132, at 4-25, 4-27 (noting how 
PG&E is evaluating 552 miles transmission line miles in HFTD to determine whether to 
remove from future PSPS events). 
 135. Trageser, supra note 98. 
 136. See Cagle, supra note 8. 
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energization was deployed over other possible measures or 
actions.137 
For PG&E, the incentive of resorting to de-energization remains great.  
Its recent emergence from bankruptcy—coupled with wildfire 
settlement claims valued at $25.5 billion—presents much doubt as to 
whether PG&E will implement power shutoffs only as a tool of last 
resort; as it emerges from bankruptcy, PG&E instead appears to focus 
on expansion of its executive level officers.138  At the same time, 
PG&E’s post-bankruptcy commitments vaguely reference its objective 
to repairing, replacing, or upgrading its infrastructure responsible for 
those wildfire settlements.139  The only concrete details are found in 
PG&E’s WMP Reports: 171 miles completed in 2019, 241 miles 
targeted for 2020, 180 miles targeted for 2021, with an overall 7,100 
miles of overhead facility hardening to occur over a twelve-fourteen year 
timespan.140  Consequently, broad PG&E de-energization authority 
poses a specific and growing danger to the public because of its current 
financial status, past criminal liability, and expansive utility territory 
servicing millions of Californians—factors collectively potentially 
postponing critical infrastructure repairs.141 
The California Constitution vests the California Legislature and the 
CPUC with the authority to set just compensation for utilities.142  This 
includes allowing a utility to recover a reasonable return for investing in 
its electrical infrastructure.143  The CPUC must allow an IOU a fair return 
 
 137. CPUC DECISION 19-05-042, supra note 35, at 68. 
 138.  See PG&E Achieves Bankruptcy Court Confirmation of its Plan of Reorganization, 
PG&E (June 20, 2020), https://www.pgecurrents.com/2020/06/20/pge-achieves-bankruptcy-
court-confirmation-of-its-plan-of-reorganization/ (emphasizing governance, oversight and 
operational strengthening by establishing a new safety committee, new board of directors, and 
expanding responsibilities for certain executive-level officers). 
 139. Compare id., with PG&E Corporation and Pacific Gas and Electric Company Case 
No. 19-30088, PG&E, https://restructuring.primeclerk.com/pge/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2021) 
(case background) (“Throughout the Chapter 11 Process, PG&E remains committed to . . . 
[c]ontinuing to make critical investments in system safety and maintenance[.]”). 
 140. UPDATED 2020 WMP REPORT, supra note 132, at 3, 7; see also Kavya Balaraman, 
PG&E exits bankruptcy, but long-term wildfire risk would put it ‘back in the soup’, UTIL. 
DIVE (July 6, 2020), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/pge-exits-bankruptcy-but-long-term-
wildfire-risk-could-put-it-back-in-th/581017/; see also PG&E 2021 WMP REPORT, supra 
note 132, at 558. 
 141. Katie Worth & Karen Pinchin, After Deadly Fire, Regulators and Consumers 
Question PG&E Blackouts, PBS (Nov. 15, 2019), 
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/deadly-paradise-fire-regulators-consumers-pge-
blackouts-pge-outage/. See generally CAMP FIRE REPORT, supra note 25. 
 142. CAL. CONST. art. XII, § 5. 
 143. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 399.2(c) (2001). 
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on infrastructure investment; failing to do so would amount to 
confiscatory ratesetting prohibited by the U.S. Constitution.144 
In 2019, PG&E estimated how complying with inspection and 
vegetation trimming requests would yield costs between $75 and $150 
billion—an amount the utility argues would pass down to ratepayers: 
“PG&E would inevitably need to turn to California ratepayers for 
funding, resulting in a substantial increase—an estimated one-year 
increase of more than five times current rates in typical utility bills.”145  
Currently, PG&E assets hover at $94 billion, with annual revenue 
slightly above $17 billion.146  But in December 2020, PG&E received 
CPUC approval for rate increases to fund infrastructure repairs aimed at 
reducing de-energization execution—a reminder of the CPUC obligation 
to allow utilities a fair return opportunity for their infrastructure 
investment costs.147  Thus, one question arises: how can the CPUC 
ensure PG&E commits to repairing its infrastructure (on account of the 
ratepayer increase) while reducing power shutoffs?  In exploring this 
question, the discussion evaluates current CPUC orders addressing 
utility de-energization requirements. 
G. De-Energization Requirements 
The CPUC outlines several requirements public utilities must 
satisfy when exercising de-energization.148  CPUC Resolution ESRB-8 
extends de-energization authority to all IOUs but mandates utilities: (1) 
employ all “feasible and appropriate attempts” to notify customers of a 
planned power shutoff before executing such a plan; (2) provide a 
detailed report of the de-energization event to the Director of Safety 
Enforcement Division (SED)—a division of the CPUC—and; (3) 
 
 144. See L.A.Gas & Elec. Corp. v. R.R. Comm’n of Cal., 289 U.S. 287, 314-17 (1933) 
(holding that the United States Constitution prohibits confiscatory rate setting). 
 145. Jim Christie, PG&E puts cost of judge’s wildfire plan at up to $150 billion, REUTERS 
(Jan. 23, 2019, 4:12 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pg-e-us-wildfire/pge-puts-cost-
of-judges-wildfire-plan-at-up-to-150-billion-idUSKCN1PI00P. 
 146. PG&E (PCG), FORBES, https://www.forbes.com/companies/pge/?sh=7ceac70545e4 
(last updated Jan. 27, 2021). See Madeleine Gregory, Millions of Californians Lost Power 
Because PG&E Refused to Spend Money to Fix Its Problems, VICE (Oct. 11, 2019, 7:19 AM), 
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/a35y38/millions-of-californians-lost-power-because-
pgande-refused-to-spend-money-to-fix-its-problems. 
 147. PG&E Receives State Approval for Investments Aimed at Improving Safety, 
Reducing Wildfire Risk and Building a Stronger Energy System for the Future, PG&E, 
https://www.pge.com/en/about/newsroom/newsdetails/index.page?title=20201203_pge_rece
ives_state_approval_for_investments_aimed_at_improving_safety_reducing_wildfire_risk_
and_building_a_stronger_energy_system_for_the_future (last visited Jan. 27, 2021) 
[hereinafter PG&E GRC Rate Approval]. 
 148. ESRB-8, supra note 16, at 5-9. 
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highlight mitigation efforts addressing de-energization consequences.149  
The CPUC retains reasonableness review power over de-energization 
efforts, but has yet to outline concrete reasonableness guidelines.150 
Instead, the CPUC defers to IOU expertise, knowledge, and 
jurisdiction for exercising de-energization.151  The Commission 
emphasizes de-energization notification as its prime focus.152  Yet, 
absent from CPUC de-energization requirements are the utility legal 
duties to invest in critical infrastructure and workforce—directives under 
PU Codes 399 and 399.2(c).153  In leaving such mandates out, the CPUC 
fails to incorporate necessary evaluations into whether utilities are 
dedicating reasonable investments to their electrical infrastructure—
investments critical for reducing the need for expansive de-energization 
events. 
1. Public Notification 
Resolution ESRB-8 demands all electric IOUs take “feasible and 
appropriate attempts” to warn the public of an impending planned 
power-shutoff.154  ESRB-8 does not elaborate on “feasible” and 
“appropriate” efforts; however, ESRB-8 highlights two explicit 
notification requirements.  First, IOUs must notify likely affected local 
communities before effectuating their de-energization plans regardless 
if a power shut off occurs.155  No specific time length is given, but an 
IOU must explain its failure to provide customers with at least two hours 
prior notice.156 Decision 12-04-024—as applied to SDG&E—sheds 
further light on public alert considerations.  There, SDG&E articulated 
its protocols for public-safety outages: pre-recorded telephone notice to 
the general population, specialized supplemental alerts for medical 
baseline and life support customers, and text alerts to those with hearing 
disabilities.157  The CPUC does not mandate that all other IOUs follow 
SDG&E protocols because power shutoffs are often reactive and occur 
when a utility anticipates immediate threats to its electrical 
infrastructure.158  Instead, the CPUC encourages alert prioritization to 
 
 149. Id. at 1, 5-9. 
 150. See id. at 5. 
 151. CPUC DECISION 19-05-042, supra note 35, at 119. 
 152. See id. 
 153. See id. at 32; ESRB-8, supra note 16, at 9; but see CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE §§ 399, 
399.2(c) (2001). 
 154. ESRB-8, supra note 16, at 1. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 5. 
 157. CPUC DECISION 12-04-024, supra note 16, at 8-9. 
 158. Id. at 8. 
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critical service providers (schools, hospitals, prisons, public safety 
agencies, telecommunications utilities, and water districts) and 
populations most vulnerable to power shutoffs—customers relying on 
power to stay alive.159 
Second, when possible, an IOU must notify the Safety and 
Enforcement Division before a de-energization occurs.160  This change 
varies from SDG&E guidelines mandating the notification of the 
Director of CPSD (now SED) within twelve hours before it shuts off 
power.161  SED reporting is not at issue here; rather, the concern lies with 
de-energization impacts on vulnerable communities overall.  For 
working families with few affordable alternative sources of energy 
required for day-to-day needs, de-energization results in lost wages and 
spoiled food.162  For the medically vulnerable, de-energization escalates 
to a life and death situation where breathing machines can no longer 
function, and life saving medication cannot be properly preserved.163  
For non-English speakers, alerts limited to only a few languages leave 
particular communities without critical information.164  Notification 
prioritization addresses few of the significant impacts that widespread 
de-energization inflicts on poorer populations.165 
2. Reporting 
ESRB-8 requires IOUs to report their de-energization action plans 
to state regulators.166  Originally, PSPS reporting standards applied only 
to SDG&E.167  The CPUC now requires all IOUs to follow SDG&E 
reporting mandates.168 
All electric IOUs must submit a report to the Director of SED 
within ten days after each de-energization event, including notifications 
to local governments and customers—even when no power shutoff 
occurs.169  This report must detail at a minimum: (i) the date of contact 
to affected community representatives; (ii) classification of zones 
according to General Order 95; (iii) an explanation if unable to provide 
 
 159. Id. at 10. 
 160. ESRB-8, supra note 16, at 6. 
 161. CPUC DECISION 12-04-024, supra note 16, at 36. 
 162. Jackie Botts, “We need the food that we lost.” Low-income families still reeling from 
blackouts, CALMATTERS (Nov. 22, 2019), https://calmatters.org/projects/california-psps-
power-shutoffs-poverty-spoiled-food-hunger/. 
 163. Gregory, supra note 146. 
 164. Id. 
 165. See id. 
 166. ESRB-8, supra note 16, at 5-9. 
 167. Id. at 5. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
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notification to affected customers at least two hours before any de-
energization event; (iv) a summary of filed complaints against the IOU 
because of shutoffs; (v) a detailed description of steps taken to restore 
power, and; (vi) identify by address each community assistance location 
during the shutoff event as well as days and hours of operation.170 
In turn, Order 12-04-24 directs SDG&E to notify the CPSD within 
twelve hours after shutting off power.171  Upon conclusion of the event, 
the utility must submit a comprehensive report detailing information 
leading up to, during, and following the event.172  The report must 
provide: (i) “an explanation of SDG&E’s decision to shut off power;” 
(ii) all factors considered, including wind speeds, temperatures, 
humidity levels, and vegetation moisture near de-energized circuits; (iii) 
the time, locations, and duration of the power shutoff; (iv) number of 
affected customers according to residential, medical baseline, 
commercial/industrial, and other; (v) any wind-related damage to 
SDG&E power lines in de-energized areas; (vi) a description of notice 
to customers and mitigation efforts, and; (vii) any other matters SDG&E 
believes relevant in assessing whether its decision to shut off the power 
was reasonable.173  ESRB-8 extends similar reporting requirements to all 
IOUs.174 
Excluded from IOU reporting: de-energization impacts on 
economically vulnerable households.  Neither Decision 12-04-042 for 
SDG&E, ESRB-8 as applied to all IOUs, nor Decision 19-05-042 
mandate detailed analysis into the extent to which poor communities 
stand impacted from de-energization.175  Reporting requirements 
emphasize notification, language-tailored alerts, geographical and 
cultural demographics of affected areas, strategies for in-person 
warnings, and coordination efforts with local and state agencies.176  Yet, 
without including de-energization impacts on economically vulnerable 
households, current CPUC de-energization reviews risk overlooking 
critical inquires into whether de-energization raises other substantial 
public safety issues.177  Likewise, for utilities, not incorporating 
economic impacts on low-income households into their mandated 
 
 170. Id. 
 171. CPUC DECISION 12-04-024, supra note 16, at 36. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 36-37. 
 174. ESRB-8, supra note 16, at 5. 
 175. CPUC DECISION 20-05-051, supra note 16, at 22-32 (requiring all IOUs to utilize all 
reasonable communications channels to reach all populations potentially impacted by power 
shutoff events). See also CPUC DECISION 19-05-042, supra note 35, at 116-131; CPUC 
DECISION 12-04-024, supra note 16, at 9-11, 34-37; ESRB-8, supra note 16, at 6-7.   
 176. CPUC DECISION 19-05-042, supra note 35, at 126-127. 
 177. See Gregory, supra note 146. 
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reports prevents full appreciation of the broader consequences following 
from power shutoff execution. 
3. Mitigation Efforts 
Along with notification and reporting, an IOU must highlight 
mitigation efforts taken during and after a de-energization event.178  
Mitigation can include local outreach through workshops addressing 
notification needs in affected communities—especially those with 
prevalent language barriers, disabilities, and elderly populations.179  The 
effectiveness of outreach depends on whether community concerns 
influence de-energization plans. 
De-energization requirements focus on notification to communities 
affected by de-energization; mitigation largely remains under IOU 
discretion.180  To the CPUC, the importance lies with identifying, 
educating, and notifying vulnerable populations to ensure maximized 
resiliency during and following planned power shutoffs.181 
4. CPUC Reasonableness Review 
The CPUC possesses broad rulemaking authority over all public 
utilities falling within its jurisdiction.182  When it comes to de-
energization, the CPUC specifically retains the power of review: the 
Commission can inquire into whether a utility reasonably de-energized 
its infrastructure based on the dangerous weather and fire conditions at 
the time of shutoff.183  Yet, the Commission stops short of embracing a 
strict reasonableness test.184  Instead, IOUs are expected to employ their 
best judgment on a case-by-case basis when executing power shutoffs.185 
Utilities can de-energize when confronting heightened wildfire 
threats.186  Certainly, emergencies warrant granting IOUs flexible 
 
 178. ESRB-8, supra note 16, at 6-7.   
 179. Id. at 6. See generally CPUC DECISION 20-05-051, supra note 16. 
 180. See CPUC DECISION 19-05-042, supra note 35, at 116-19. 
 181. See id. at 117. 
 182. CAL. CONST. art. XII, § 6. 
 183. CPUC DECISION 12-04-024, supra note 16, at 35. 
 184. CPUC DECISION 19-05-042, supra note 35, at 123. 
 185. ESRB-8, supra note 16, at 4, 8 (“[The IOU] must reasonably believe that there is an 
imminent and significant risk that strong winds will topple its power lines onto tinder dry 
vegetation or will cause major vegetation-related impacts on its facilities during periods of 
extreme fire hazard.”). 
 186. Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) / De-Energization, CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, 
https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/deenergization/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2021) (“In 2012, the CPUC 
ruled that California Public Utilities Code Sections 451 and 399.2(a) give electric utilities 
authority to shut off electric power in order to protect public safety. This allows energy 
companies (SDG&E, PG&E, SCE, Liberty, Bear Valley and PacifiCorp) to shut off power for 
the prevention of fires where strong winds, heat events, and related conditions are present.”). 
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authority over de-energization action plans.  But the absence of a 
streamlined reasonableness standard focused on evaluating the integrity 
of utility infrastructure encourages PSPS becoming a general wildfire 
response rather than a tool of last resort.  Without inquiring into whether 
a de-energizing utility remains committed to infrastructure repairs and 
maintenance, the CPUC leaves out critical information in its 
reasonableness review. 
The CPUC already evaluates utility investment proposals and 
requests for increasing customer electric rates through its General Rate 
Case (GRC) proceedings.187  In December 2020, the CPUC approved 
PG&E rate increases for customers through the GRC process.188  PG&E 
cites the GRC rate increase as a: 
[N]ecessary investment in PG&E’s electric and gas distribution 
systems . . . including  investments to reduce the risk of catastrophic 
wildfires through electric system hardening,  enhanced vegetation 
management, system automation, and asset inspection and repair.  
The GRC also enables PG&E to continue its efforts to make Public 
Safety Power Shutoff  (PSPS) events smaller in size, shorter in 
duration and smarter in execution.189 
But for PG&E, its objectives of electric system hardening and reducing 
PSPS execution requires a more assertive CPUC role to ensure the utility 
adheres to those commitments.  Without an ongoing de-energization 
reasonableness review centered on utility infrastructure integrity, the 
utilities have an open door to forgo their infrastructure maintenance 
obligations, deviate from compliance with safe and reliable power 
mandates, and transform PSPS into a general wildfire response to stave 
off liability.190  The reality for financially distressed utilities like PG&E 
 
 187. Electric Rates, CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, 
https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/electricrates/#:~:text=The%20CPUC%20must%20approve*%20al
l,CPUC%20proceedings%20called%20ratemaking%20proceedings (last visited Mar. 10, 
2021). PG&E Receives State Approval for Investments Aimed at Improving Safety, Reducing 
Wildfire Risk and Building a Stronger Energy System for the Future, PG&E, 
https://www.pge.com/en/about/newsroom/newsdetails/index.page?title=20201203_pge_rece
ives_state_approval_for_investments_aimed_at_improving_safety_reducing_wildfire_risk_
and_building_a_stronger_energy_system_for_the_future (last visited Mar. 10, 2021). 
 188. PG&E GRC Rate Approval, supra note 147 (“With the CPUC approval of the 
settlement agreement, the average monthly bill for a typical residential electric and gas 
customer will increase by $13.44 a month. This includes $10.40 for electric and $3.05 for gas 
service. The 2020 GRC rate change . . . will be effective March 1, 2021 and will impact rates 
until Dec. 31, 2022.”). 
 189. Id. 
 190. See CPUC DECISION 19-05-042, supra note 35, at 68 (stating that under no 
circumstances may a utility execute de-energization as a sole response to ward off liability). 
See also CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 451 (1977) (promoting public safety); CAL. PUB. UTILS. 
CODE §§ 399, 399.2(c) (2001) (reasonable infrastructure investments) (safe and reliable 
operation). 
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leaves PSPS as the general wildfire response because its vastly 
deteriorating infrastructure threatens public safety, but its projected 
system hardening extends for the next twelve to fourteen years.191 
III. IDENTIFICATION OF LEGAL PROBLEMS: DE-ENERGIZATION 
UNDERCUTS STATUTORY  DIRECTIVES TO PROVIDE SAFE AND 
RELIABLE SERVICE 
California faces an increasingly dangerous situation directly 
connected to an aging electrical infrastructure.192  To meet these dangers, 
de-energization can serve as a useful tool of last resort when IOUs 
respond to weather conditions imminently threatening safe delivery of 
power.193 
Nevertheless, unfettered de-energization discretion opens a 
dangerous door for utility abuse.  Such authority acutely endangers the 
public in the midst of the current pandemic crisis—a crisis where 
millions of households rely on safe and reliable power for information 
access, maintenance of life-saving equipment and medication, 
telemedicine, emergency communications, storage of expensive food, 
virtual learning, and work-from-home.194  In the case of PG&E, its 
financial situation, past criminal implications, decaying infrastructure, 
and widespread power shutoffs exemplify the dangers of permitting a 
utility with a poor safety track record to unilaterally de-energize without 
evaluating the integrity of its electrical system through a CPUC 
reasonableness review.195 
As a consequence, without sufficient CPUC oversight, broad IOU 
de-energization raises three specific concerns: (1) PSPS authority 
undermines adherence with investment duties under PU Codes 451, 399, 
and 399.2; (2) PSPS execution and potential access to a new wildfire 
fund incentivize utilities to side-step critical repairs to their electric 
facilities—investments integral to safe and reliable power; and (3) PSPS 
authority disproportionately impacts socially and economically 
vulnerable communities—communities devastated by the current 
coronavirus pandemic. 
 
 191. UPDATED 2020 WMP REPORT, supra note 132, at 3, 7 (reporting that PG&E 
completed system hardening of overhead distribution lines in High Fire Threat Districts for 
171 miles, plans to target 241 miles in 2020, and completing a total of 7,100 miles of 
hardening over the next twelve to fourteen years). 
 192. Cagle, supra note 8. 
 193. CPUC DECISION 19-05-042, supra note 35, at 123. 
 194. See JOINT MOTION FOR EMERGENCY ORDER, supra note 27, at 2-3. 
 195. Gregory, supra note 146. 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
A. Broad De-Energization Authority Undermines PU Codes § 451, § 
399, and § 399.2 
PU Code 451 mandates utilities to deliver just and reasonable 
electrical power as necessary to promote public safety.196  PU Code 399 
reinforces public safety by directing prudent investments in utility 
electrical systems, and a competent and adequately sized workforce.197  
PU Code 399.2 then lays further responsibility on IOUs to operate 
facilities in a safe and reliable manner.198  Collectively, these provisions 
demand electrical corporations furnish safe and reliable power by 
maintaining a trained and sized workforce, operating in a safe and 
reliable manner and prudently investing in utility-owned electrical 
infrastructure.199 
In October of 2019, PG&E cut power to nearly three million 
people.200  Yet, PG&E projects its de-energization program will continue 
for the next five years.201  Nevertheless, extreme conditions cannot 
overshadow years of inadequate PG&E recordkeeping regarding the age, 
composition, and degree of wear concerning its electrical infrastructure 
system.202  The Butte County Report details how investigations into the 
PG&E San Bruno Gas Explosion and the Camp Fire revealed an 
alarming shared characteristic: “PG&E never made an effort to examine, 
evaluate and catalogue the components of those lines.”203  As the Butte 
Report highlights regarding the Camp Fire: 
In a written response to a CPUC data request PG&E states “PG&E 
has not historically  maintained an inventory of suspension hooks or 
their manufacturers, age or material  composition. As a result, PG&E 
does not have an inventory of all transmission and distribution 
facilities in the entire PG&E service territory organized by location 
and the presence of suspension hooks similar to the Incident 
Location 1 suspension hook.”204 
 
 196. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 451 (1977). 
 197. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 399 (2001). 
 198. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 399.2 (2001). 
 199. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 451 (1977); CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE §§ 399, 399.2(c) 
(2001). 
 200. Newburger, supra note 3. 
 201. Senate Committee Wildfire Hearing, supra note 6, at 1:01:00 (statement by PG&E 
CEO William “Bill” Johnson) (“I think for us, in Northern California, it will take us probably 
five years to get to the point where we can largely eliminate this tool.”). UPDATED 2020 WMP 
REPORT, supra note 132, at 4-2. 
 202. See CAMP FIRE REPORT, supra note 25, at 66 n.124.   
 203. Id. at 66. 
 204. Id. at 66 n.124. 
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Consider the magnitude of PG&E not maintaining an account of the age 
and composition of its electrical system: PG&E service territory 
encompasses more than 50,000 steel transmission structures, 100,000 
non-steel transmission structures, and more than two million distribution 
poles.205  Yet, PG&E acknowledges it has not “historically” tracked the 
age, composition, and degree of wear of such an expansive electrical 
system.206  Evidentiary findings into the Camp Fire revealed the fire 
resulted from excessive wear of an approximately 100-year-old “C-
hook” responsible for holding up an insulator assembly attached to a 
tower, and used for supporting electrified power lines.207  When 
questioned about similar wear identified in another tower along with 
evidence of repairs made to that tower, PG&E asserted it had “no records 
of when or why this work was done.”208 
PG&E electrical infrastructure services over 16 million customers 
across 70,000 square miles spanning the Bay Area, Northern and Central 
California—customers relying on the utility to reinforce its facilities.209  
Failure to maintain records of the age, composition, and other critical 
information regarding infrastructure equipment translates into blindly 
operating decaying electrical infrastructure endangering the public.  
California faces a dire situation where public safety depends on private 
decisions to adequately repair utility-owned electrical systems and to 
maintain records of its facilities.210  PG&E admits it cannot guarantee 
the safety of its electric lines by pointing to an inadequate supply of 
trained personal for its failure to implement widespread inspections and 
repairs of its electrical lines.211  Simply stated, PG&E cannot guarantee 
it will follow the law. 
Here, broad de-energization discretion threatens noncompliance 
with utility duties to promote public safety, to safely and reliably operate 
electrical systems, and to reasonably invest in utility-owned 
infrastructure by instead incentivizing power shutoffs as the method of 
addressing wildfire dangers.212  De-energization presents an attractive 
option for the utility: it can proactively execute power shutoffs during 
emergencies—emergencies created by its own failures to adequately 
replace decaying facilities and maintain a sizeable workforce—as its 
method of delaying repairs.  In such a situation, de-energization proves 
 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. at 19-20, 66 n.124. 
 207. Id. at 2-3, 19-22. See also Cagle, supra note 8. 
 208. CAMP FIRE REPORT, supra note 25, at 21. 
 209. Trageser, supra note 98. 
 210.  Cagle, supra note 8. 
 211. See PG&E 2019 WILDFIRE SAFETY PLAN, supra note 128, at 55. 
 212. Cagle, supra note 8. 
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disastrous to public safety by manipulating a narrowly tailored tool 
intended for dangerous weather conditions into a broad instrument 
circumventing utility duties.213 
B. De-Energization and New Wildfire Fund Incentivize Sidestepping 
Expensive, but  Critical Infrastructure Repairs 
PU Code 399.2 outlines two general IOU investment duties: 
399.2(a) directs electrical corporations to operate their electrical 
infrastructure in a safe and reliable manner while 399.2(c) directs 
prudent investments in utility-owned electrical infrastructure.214  IOUs 
operate via a cost-benefit analysis in which grid safety coincides with 
affordable prices—a calculus complicated by climate change.215  But a 
recently enacted wildfire fund emboldens electric utilities to sidestep 
their investment duties and endanger the lives of customers, employees 
and the public. 
In 2019, Governor Gavin Newsom signed into law Assembly Bill 
1054 (the Wildfire Fund), allowing electrical corporations to recover just 
and reasonable costs resulting from a catastrophic wildfire if the utility 
acted reasonably under the circumstances.216  Specifically, the CPUC 
must determine whether: 
[A]n electrical corporation’s conduct was reasonable if that conduct, 
related to the  ignition, was consistent with action that a reasonable 
utility would have undertaken in  good faith under similar 
circumstances, at the relevant point in time, and based on the 
information available to the electrical corporation at the time, as 
provided.217 
AB 1054 imposes the initial burden of reasonableness on the utility.218  
The electrical corporation must demonstrate its reasonable conduct by a 
preponderance of evidence—unless the utility possesses a valid safety 
certification during the fund application time period, in which holding a 
certificate presumes reasonable conduct unless serious doubt is raised.219  
 
 213. See CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 451 (1977); CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE §§ 399, 399.2(c) 
(2001); see also CPUC DECISION 19-05-042, supra note 35, at 123. 
 214. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 399.2 (2001). 
 215. Cagle, supra note 8 (“Utilities are motivated to keep their grid as safe as they can for 
the price they can afford, according to a risk model that’s been upended by climate change. 
New fire risks may present a new crisis to power utilities, but so long as they manage their 
liabilities within the ‘prudent’ buffer, there’s little incentive to change course.”). See generally 
Ghadessi & Zafar, supra note 70, at 3 (“Investors expect to earn a return on their capital.”). 
 216. Wildfire Fund and Safety Certificates, CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, 
https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/safetycertificates/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2021). 
 217. Assem. B. 1054, 2019-2020 (Cal. 2020) (Legislative Counsel’s Digest). 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
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Reasonable conduct “encompasses a spectrum of possible practices, 
methods, or acts consistent with utility system needs,” ratepayer 
interests, and regulator requirements.220 
To qualify for safety certification—and establish a presumption of 
reasonable conduct—a utility must meet the mandates under PU Code 
8389(e).221  Safety certification requirements include a utility providing 
documentation of: (1) an approved Wildfire Mitigation Plan (WMP); (2) 
good standing; (3) an established safety committee board; (4) an 
executive compensation plan “structured to promote safety as a 
priority;” (5) executive-level reporting to the CPUC; (6) executive 
officer compensation tied to an electrical corporation’s long-term 
performance and value; and (7) implementation of its approved WMP.222  
Certification shall issue to the utility upon satisfaction of the 
requirements.223  On January 14, 2021, PG&E officially received its 
Wildfire Safety Certification—joining SDG&E and SCE—despite an 
ongoing Cal Fire investigation into whether PG&E equipment may be 
responsible for the Zogg Fire, which killed four people.224 
At one end, the fund pools critical funds for utilities to access and 
pay out wildfire victims.  Under California law, IOUs and their 
customers remain liable for covering property damages connected to 
fires sparked by utility equipment.225  Pooling liability dollars into a 
centralized wildfire fund helps alleviate this imposed legal 
responsibility.226  Yet, the Wildfire Fund provides a dual layer of 
protection for utilities—such as PG&E—where de-energization may 
substitute for electrical facility investments, workforce, and operations; 
at the same time, a utility can access an expansive wildfire liability fund 
tantamount to a bailout.227  With a customer base of sixteen million, the 
 
 220. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 451.1 (1977). 
 221. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE §§ 8389(e)(1)-(7) (2020). 
 222. Id. 
 223. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 8389(e) (2020). 
 224.  Letter from Caroline T. Jacobs, Dir., Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Wildfire Safety Div., 
to Robert Kenney, PG&E Vice President of Reg. Affairs (Jan. 14, 2021) (on file with the 
California Public Utilities Commission). See also Jaxon Van Derbeken, Judge Presses PG&E 
for Zogg Fire Answers, NBC BAY AREA (Feb. 18, 2021, 8:20 PM), 
https://www.nbcbayarea.com/investigations/judge-presses-pge-for-zogg-fire-
answers/2471868/. 
 225. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19 (requiring just compensation for private property taken for 
public use). See also Barham v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 74 Cal. App. 4th 744, 753 (1999) (holding 
private utilities could be held liable as a public entity subject to California Constitution Article 
1, Section 19). 
 226. See CAL. CONST. Art. I, § 19. 
 227. See George Skelton, With new California wildfire law, Newsom didn’t let perfect be 
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Wildfire Fund reflects state legislature judgments holding PG&E 
remains “too big to fail” because it powers nearly forty percent of 
California, and the goal of keeping large utilities in service by softening 
wildfire liability costs.228 
Nevertheless, the law raises two critical inquiries: (1) whether the 
CPUC retains reasonableness review over utility access to this new 
wildfire fund and; (2) whether failure to reasonably invest in owned 
infrastructure outlined by PU Code 399.2 falls into the reasonable de-
energization calculus.229 
The CPUC has yet to address these inquiries, and current decisions 
do not incorporate 399.2(c) infrastructure investments into the de-
energization reasonableness review.230  For PG&E, de-energization and 
potential wildfire fund access diminish incentives to promptly repair its 
electrical facilities—infrastructure responsible for significant loss of life 
and property.231  Following PG&E’s unprecedented power shutoff to 
millions of customers, the CPUC publicly notified its intent to 
investigate the utility for PSPS compliance.232  The investigation aims to 
evaluate all IOU PSPS action plans and ensure de-energization remains 
a tool of last resort.233  For PG&E, the CPUC is investigating whether 
the utility should be sanctioned for violating PU Code 451, Decision 19-
05-042, and Resolution ESRB-8, in connection with its widespread de-
energization communication mishandling, failure to alert customers, and 
coordination breakdowns with local governments during the October 
2019 de-energization blackout.234  Yet, the 2020 SED Report on the 2019 
Public Safety Power Shutoff Events did not inquire into the integrity of 
PG&E infrastructure, PU Code 399.2 utility infrastructure investment 
mandates, nor PG&E’s potential access to the Wildfire Fund, but does 
reinforce the need for additional de-energization notification 
requirements.235 
 
 228. See id. 
 229. See CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 451.1(b) (1977). 
 230. See generally CPUC DECISION 20-05-051, supra note 16; CPUC DECISION 19-05-
042, supra note 35; ESRB-8, supra note 16. 
 231. See Trageser, supra note 98. 
 232. Press Release, Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, CPUC Takes Additional Decisive Actions to 
Hold Utilities Accountable and Increase Public Safety (Oct. 28, 2019), 
http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M318/K885/318885370.PDF. 
 233. See CPUC to Examine Recent Utility PSPS Events, supra note 107, at 2. 
 234. See generally CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, ASSIGNED COMMISSIONER AND 
ASSIGNED ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE’S RULING DIRECTING PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC 
COMPANY TO SHOW CAUSE WHY IT SHOULD NOT BE SANCTIONED BY THE COMMISSION 
FOR VIOLATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES CODE SECTIONS 451 COMMISSION DECISION 19-05-
042 AND RESOLUTION ESRB-8, at 1 (Nov. 11, 2019). 
 235. See SED 2019 PSPS REPORT, supra note 1, at 83-87. 
 
688 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:61 
Climate change heightens wildfire dangers and complicates 
mitigation efforts for utilities and the public as the climate becomes drier 
and hotter, temperatures experience extreme swings between hot and 
cold, and drought and flood change the topography.  Drought-like 
conditions increase dry vegetation growing alongside electrical lines, 
and excessive winds present the danger of ignition even when vegetation 
management requirements are observed.236  For PG&E, its service 
territory encompasses widespread electrical poles, lines, and facilities 
near extensive tree populations and brush.237  Addressing these risks 
requires deploying numerous workers and equipment, all impacting a 
financial bottom line.238 
While climate change poses new risks, utilities have an ongoing 
duty to provide safe and reliable service adapted to current conditions.  
Negligent maintenance of electrical infrastructure elevates safety risks 
because faulty or old facilities are ill adept at withstanding extreme 
weather conditions.239  Excessively aged power poles cannot withstand 
high winds—a lesson learned from the fatal Camp Fire.240  Facilities 
must also withstand sustained winds: 
High winds or sustained winds may induce metal on metal rub and 
create dangerous conditions including conductor splice failures or 
wear on fasteners, hardware, and other equipment that can ignite 
fires.241  The CPUC’s Safety and Enforcement Division (SED) found 
that “higher sustained winds are more likely to cause motion in non-
tensioned lines and hardware, such as jumpers.”242 
Operating infrastructure beyond the anticipated useful life stands 
inconsistent with the delivery of safe and reliable power.  Yet, IOUs can 
practically sidestep necessary repairs to electrical infrastructure by 
instead shutting off power when fire hazards acutely threaten the very 
facilities utilities are charged with maintaining.243  Despite viable duty 
breaches under CPUC regulations, extensive wildfire liability, 
 
 236. See Cagle, supra note 8. 
 237. See Worth & Pinchin, supra note 141. 
 238. See id. 
 239. See Newburger, supra note 3. 
 240. See Cagle, supra note 8. 
 241. Amici Comments in Opposition to the Probation Conditions Suggested by PG&E, 
The Federal Monitor, and the U.S. Dep’t of Just. at 17, United States v. PG&E, No. 14-cr-
00175, 2016 WL 1298388 (N.D. Cal. July 16, 2016) (No. CR 14-0175 WHA). 
 242. Id. (quoting CPUC, APPENDIX A SED INCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT FOR 2018 
CAMP FIRE WITH ATTACHMENTS 48 (Nov. 8, 2019), 
ftp://ftp.cpuc.ca.gov/News_and_Outreach/I1906015%20Appendix%20A%20SED%20Camp
%20Fire%20Investigation%20Report%20REDACTED.pdf).   
 243. See id. at 18. 
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deteriorating infrastructure, and operations risking public safety, PG&E 
submitted its Safety Certification Request but has yet to receive one.244 
C. De-Energization Disproportionately Impacts Socially and 
Economically  Vulnerable Communities 
Currently, ratepayers have few options for purchasing their 
electricity.245  Even if an electrical customer chooses a different retailer 
to serve its electrical needs, a competitive retailer—whether owned by a 
municipality or privately controlled—depends on PG&E electric 
distribution and transmission lines to transfer power to the electric 
retailer end-use customer.246  When electrical utilities de-energize their 
lines, socially and economically sensitive communities stand acutely 
vulnerable to power disruptions.247  The CPUC remains aware of this 
threat.248  The Commission places emphasis on notification and 
mitigation efforts but falls short of analyzing specific impacts affecting 
these communities during prolonged de-energization events.249  Order 
19-05-042 identifies vulnerable communities as populations with access 
and functional needs (AFN),250 but those bearing the full force of de-
energization blackouts include medical baseline customers, poor 
communities, and households with undocumented member.251  The 
 
 244. Wildfire Fund and Safety Certificates, supra note 216 (“A safety certification allows 
an electrical corporation to recover catastrophic wildfire costs from its ratepayers, or from the 
Wildfire Insurance Fund, if applicable, using a burden of proof test that is easier to satisfy 
than would be the case if [the corporation] did not have a safety certification. To obtain a 
safety certification, the electrical corporation must satisfy the conditions of Public Utilities 
Code Section 8389(e)(1-7).”). See generally Jaxon Van Derbeken, PG&E Critics Welcome 
Regulators’ New Stance, NBC BAY AREA (Nov. 25, 2020, 7:12 PM), 
https://www.nbcbayarea.com/investigations/pge-critics-welcome-regulators-new-
stance/2408525/ (sharing comments by Catherine J.K. Sandoval, Santa Clara Law Professor 
and former CPUC Commissioner, on the CPUC warning PG&E how its prior safety record 
could jeopardize its 2020 Safety Certification) (“This is a good step . . . I have become very 
concerned over the years that PG&E is not learning the lessons from its failures, and is not 
implementing them.”). 
 245. Cagle, supra note 8. 
 246. See Gregory, supra note 146. 
 247. Id. 
 248. CPUC DECISION 19-05-042, supra note 35, at 7 (“[D]e-energization can leave 
communities and essential facilities without power, which brings its own risks and hardships, 
particularly for vulnerable communities and individuals.”). 
 249. Id. at 83. 
 250. Id. at 78 (citing CAL. GOV. CODE § 8593.3 (2021)) (“[T]he access and functional 
needs population consists of individuals who have . . . intellectual disabilities, physical 
disabilities, chronic conditions, injuries, limited English proficiency or who are non-English 
speaking, older adults, children, people living in institutionalized settings, or those who are 
low income, homeless, or transportation disadvantaged, including, but not limited to, those 
who are dependent on public transit or those who are pregnant.”). 
 251. Botts, supra note 162. 
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current global pandemic further intensifies de-energization dangers 
already affecting these same populations.252 
1. Medically Vulnerable Populations 
For the medically vulnerable, repeated prolonged power shutoffs 
endanger individuals dependent on electricity to stay alive.253  When 
utilities de-energize power, individuals with dependent on life-saving 
equipment face a life and death situation.254  Replacing insulin is costly 
and time-consuming and may require interaction with the public that 
increases the risk of exposure to COVID-19.255  Many breathing 
machines can lack backup batteries or have batteries capable of only a 
few hours of operation.256  The 2019 PG&E blackouts spanned several 
days in many areas.257  At the same time, PG&E’s advanced notification 
and community outreach failed to mitigate widespread de-energization 
hardships experienced across several counties affecting millions of 
people.258  With PG&E projecting expansive de-energization for the next 
five years, medically vulnerable populations remain at risk until the 
utility fundamentally strengthens its decaying infrastructure.259 
2. Economically Distressed Communities 
For poor communities, de-energization leaves few alternatives for 
meeting household energy needs.  Generators are expensive and require 
constant steady sources of fuel for continued operation.260  Diesel 
generators—for those able to afford them—exacerbate air pollution and 
“produce ‘black carbon’ emissions and fine particulates including 
particulate matter 2.5 (PM 2.5) which induce climate change and ill-
 
 252. JOINT MOTION FOR EMERGENCY ORDER, supra note 27, at 17-21. 
 253. Sotolongo et al., supra note 2, at 5. 
 254. See id. 
 255. Are You Prepared in the Event of a Power Outage?, STANISLAUS COUNTY, 
http://www.schsa.org/publichealth/pages/power-outage/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2021) 
[hereinafter Power Outage]. See also S. Vincent Rajkumar, The High Cost of Insulin in the 
United States: An Urgent Call to Action, MAYO CLINIC PROC. (Jan. 1, 2020), 
https://www.mayoclinicproceedings.org/article/S0025-6196(19)31008-0/fulltext (providing 
an example of a price increase of 1000%, from $21 to $332, for one vial of insulin). 
 256. See Power Outage, supra note 255. 
 257. Id. 
 258. See CPUC Letter to PG&E, supra note 3, at 1. 
 259. Ethan Howland & Paul Ciampoli, PG&E CEO sees power shutoffs continuing for 
five years, AM. PUB. POWER ASS’N (Jan. 2, 2020), 
https://www.publicpower.org/periodical/article/pge-ceo-sees-power-shutoffs-continuing-
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 260. Roy Berendsohn, How to Safely Use a Home Generator, POPULAR MECHANICS 
(Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.popularmechanics.com/adventure/reviews/a11855/home-
generator-101-how-to-power-on-when-the-power-goes-out/. 
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health.”261  Exposure to black-carbon and particulates may increase 
asthma and compromise lung health—conditions making people more 
vulnerable to poor COVID-19 outcomes.262 
Moreover, power shutoffs disproportionally impact working and 
impoverished families as electricity loss results in spoiled food that can 
be difficult and costly for these families to replace.263  School shutdowns 
eliminate daily access to price reduced or free lunches—a staple food 
source for many low-income households as high numbers of families and 
individuals seek aid from local community food banks.264  Additionally, 
de-energization may result in lost days of work, in turn reducing earnings 
and further constraining budgets for low-income residents.265  For these 
populations, advanced de-energization notifications do not change the 
economic circumstances.  Instead, power shutoff events further dislocate 
economically sensitive communities by interrupting the power necessary 
for day-to-day functions. 
3. Non-Citizen and Undocumented Community Members 
For undocumented community members, de-energization imperils 
lives by dissuading requests for government help and limiting access to 
public assistance because of citizenship status.266  Many undocumented 
individuals refrain from seeking public aid out of fear local, state, or 
federal government workers may communicate their immigration status 
to the federal government.267  Those specifically affected include 
immigrant families, immigrants with disabilities, and immigrants fleeing 
from violence, including those because of their LGBTQ identification—
populations heavily reliant on some form of assistance during 
 
 261. Catherine J.K. Sandoval, Energy Access is Energy Justice: The Yurok Tribe’s 
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JUSTICE, INTERNATIONAL AND U.S. PERSPECTIVES 7 (Raya Salter, Carmen G. Gonzalez, 
Michael H. Dworkin, Roxanna A. Mastor, Elizabeth Kronk Warner, eds. 2018). 
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widespread de-energization events.268  Aid eligibility restrictions leaves 
these vulnerable communities without sufficient resources to endure a 
prolonged blackout.269 
Those seeking citizenship face similar dangers.  Under the new 
public charge rule implemented by the Trump Administration, the 
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services must consider: 
[T]he receipt of certain cash and non-cash public benefits, including 
those that may be  used to obtain testing or treatment for COVID-19 
in a public charge inadmissibility  determination, and for purposes of 
a public benefit condition applicable to certain  nonimmigrants 
seeking an extension of stay or change of status.270 
The Rule specifically conditions the approval of nonimmigrant visa 
holders seeking to extend their stay or change their nonimmigrant 
classification status on not receiving public benefits for more than twelve 
months—in total—within any thirty-six month period.271  Included in 
those public benefits determinations are most federally funded Medicaid 
programs, and cash and noncash benefits used to obtain COVID-19 
testing or treatment.272 
In January 2020, the Supreme Court in Department of Homeland 
Security v. New York,273 granted DHS a stay for a preliminary injunction 
issued against the new rule change pending resolution on the merits in 
the Second Circuit.274  In September 2020, the Second Circuit in New 
York v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security,275 stayed the injunction 
based on DHS demonstrating a likelihood of success on the merits of 
irreparable harm by not being able to enforce the change; but the Ninth 
Circuit in City & County of San Francisco v. USCIS,276 largely affirmed 
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government’s appeal in the Second Circuit). 
 274. Id. 
 275.  New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 974 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 2020) (staying 
injunction based on DHS showing likelihood of success on the merits of irreparable harm). 
 276. City & Cty. of S.F. v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 981 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 
2020) (affirming injunctions issued for plaintiffs grounded on showing the likelihood of 
success on the merits of irreparable harm based on new change, but vacating the nationwide 
applicability).   
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preliminary injunctions issued against the rule, although it vacated 
nationwide applicability.277  Following the 2020 Presidential Election, 
the USCIS under the Biden Administration announced it would no 
longer adhere to the 2019 Public Charge Rule changes, nor would the 
Department of Justice seek appellate review of judicial decisions 
invalidating or enjoining its enforcement.278  But the consequences for 
non-citizen immigrant community members remain clear: public charge 
considerations dissuade seeking local, state, and federal help following 
a wildfire or de-energization event out of fear doing so will lead to 
deportation or other citizenship application consequences. 
For households with undocumented immigrants, the electricity loss 
and the COVID-19 crisis force a choice between two dangerous options: 
either ride the power shutoff out for however long it may last and risk 
individual health and safety should illness or complications develop, or 
risk legal sanctions, deportation and safety by leaving home and 
exposing oneself to other infected individuals.  Dangers are further 
escalated by fire threats that force undocumented family members to 
evacuate their homes—even when they have no place to go—and risk 
deportation when staying at public shelters. 
De-energization notification, education, and community outreach 
alone cannot overcome acute economic conditions vulnerable 
communities face when widespread power shutoffs repeatedly 
compromise reliance on safe and reliable power.279  Utilities must 
comply with CPUC mandates to maintain their electrical infrastructure; 
to do otherwise circumvents their legal obligations of delivering safe and 
reliable power to those communities in most need.280  Cognizant of these 
widespread dangers, this analysis offers a specific recommendation 
falling within CPUC authority for decisive implementation in reducing 
de-energization as a general wildfire response. 
V. PROPOSAL 
The California Constitution vests the CPUC with vast regulatory 
authority over all utilities generating, transmitting, or furnishing power 
“directly or indirectly to or for the public.”281  Under this delegation, the 
Commission can “establish rules, examine records, issue subpoenas [sic] 
 
 277. Compare New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 974 F.3d, with City & Cty. of 
S.F. v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 981 F.3d at 763. 
 278. USCIS, Letter to Interagency Partners (2021). 
 279. See generally ESRB-8, supra note 16. 
 280. See CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 451 (1977); CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE §§ 399, 399.2(c) 
(2001). 
 281.  CAL. CONST. art. XII, § 3. 
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. . . and prescribe a uniform system of accounts for all public utilities 
subject to its jurisdiction.”282  At the same time, the CPUC has exercised 
its power in interpreting PU Codes 451 and 399.2 as granting IOUs de-
energization discretion while reserving for itself the power of review.283 
To ensure utilities remain committed to their legal duties of 
promoting public safety, prudent infrastructure investments, and 
delivering safe and reliable power to the public, the CPUC must evaluate 
utility infrastructure investments when conducting de-energization 
reasonableness reviews.  In line with its broad regulatory power, this 
analysis recommends the CPUC take a two-fold approach: (1) 
investigate utility compliance with the duty to invest in their electrical 
infrastructure (an infrastructure investment inquiry) and; (2) factor this 
investment inquiry into the utility de-energization reasonableness 
review.  The CPUC touts IOU discretion as a vital tool for addressing 
emergencies, but for utilities like PG&E, unfettered de-energization 
discretion threatens to become a general wildfire response amidst the 
current public health crisis and a looming 2021 Wildfire Season.284 
A. The CPUC Must Incorporate an Infrastructure Investment Inquiry 
into its  Reasonableness Review 
First, the CPUC must inquire into whether de-energization 
accompanies diligent electrical infrastructure investments.  Duties under 
PU Code 399.2 are threefold: 399.2(a) reiterates delivery of safe and 
reliable power while holding electrical corporations responsible for 
controlling, managing, operating, and maintaining owned distribution 
lines; 399.2(b) mandates compliance with PU 330; 399.2(c) directs 
reasonable investments in owned electrical infrastructure.285 
Reasonable investments in infrastructure are not mere 
recommendations—they are the law.  As an example, SDG&E has 
focused on its infrastructure investments along with reducing the scope 
of its  de-energization events.286  Yet, PG&E has expanded de-
 
 282.  Id. § 6. 
 283. CPUC DECISION 09-09-030, supra note 48, at 61-62. 
 284. See generally JOINT MOTION FOR EMERGENCY ORDER, supra note 27. 
 285. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 399.2 (2001). 
 286. Trageser, supra note 98 (“In the past decade an SDG&E spokesperson said [SDG&E] 
has spent more than $1.5 billion on wildfire preparedness . . . [overhauling] its grid to 
minimize large scale power shutoffs . . . rolling out new technology . . . including moving 
power lines underground and creating smaller grids so they can turn off power in 
neighborhoods or even individual households with the highest fire risk.”). See also CPUC 
Letter to SDG&E, supra note 17 (“While San Diego Gas and Electric (SDG&E) is often held 
up as a model for wildfire mitigation and has been able to develop a number of tools to 
minimize the impact of PSPS, SDG&E should seek to improve and learn from other utilities’ 
experiences. SDG&E should carefully assess and consider the CPUC’s directions to PG&E 
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energization while undergoing bankruptcy proceedings.287  In October 
2018, the utility cut power to 60,000 customers across six counties; 
contrast this to October 2019 when the utility shut off power to nearly 
two million customers.288  By requiring investment disclosures in de-
energization reports, the CPUC can evaluate whether utilities exercising 
power shutoffs remain committed to reasonable investment mandates 
under PU Code 399.2.289 
B. Public Safety Demands a More Assertive CPUC Approach over De-
Energization  Events 
Second, safe delivery of reliable power relies on critical 
investments in IOU-owned facilities.290  Consequently, any CPUC 
reasonableness review into de-energization necessitates evaluating 
whether power-shutoffs remain tools of last resort—not general wildfire 
responses.291  Safe, reliable power cannot exist without diligent 
investments in electrical facilities, and moving electricity via faulty or 
excessively outdated transmission and distribution lines cannot 
constitute safe delivery of such power. 
Expansive recurring power shutoffs divorced from fundamental 
upgrades to aging infrastructure fail as reasonable exercises of de-
energization authority.  The devastating 2018 Camp Fire vividly 
illustrates the dangers of operating electrical facilities well beyond age 
limits.292  In 2007, SDG&E similarly confronted the loss of life when 
utility power lines destroyed hundreds of homes and killed two 
people.293  As a result, the utility streamlined its de-energization efforts, 
implemented new technology, and relocated power lines underground.294  
But PG&E’s 2020 Wildfire Mitigation Plan limits system hardening 
strengthening to 241 miles and 7,100 miles over the next twelve to 
fourteen years even when PG&E service territory encompasses 5,500 
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miles of electric transmission lines, and 25,500 miles of distribution lines 
located in High Fire-Threat Districts; for 2021, the utility is limiting its 
hardening to 180 miles of overhead facilities in higher risk areas.295 
This means PG&E intends to target a small portion of its vast 
infrastructure located in high-fire risk areas over the course of a decade, 
despite remaining largely unaware of the age, composition, or degree of 
wear of much of its electrical system.296  Utility company failures to 
adequately invest in their own electrical infrastructure threaten reliable 
delivery of power and endanger public safety by exposing consumers to 
dangerous infrastructure and potential wildfires.297  The CPUC’s 
primary obligation rests with protecting the public safety, and to advance 
this duty requires CPUC evaluation into utility infrastructure 
investments—an integral factor currently missing from CPUC 
reasonableness review standards. 
V. CONCLUSION 
De-energization serves as a vital tool of last resort when 
emergencies necessitate immediate power shutoffs.  Yet, IOU de-
energization authority carries an accompanying danger of utility abuse.  
For PG&E, de-energization entices sidestepping its legal obligations to 
reasonably invest in its workforce and electrical infrastructure—
investments necessary for providing safe and reliable power to 
customers and the public. 
The State of California charges the California Public Utilities 
Commission with regulating all public utilities operating within its 
jurisdiction, to execute orders, and to examine IOU compliance with 
state law.  To remain consistent with its statutory obligation the CPUC 
must inquire into whether IOUs like PG&E are fulfilling their 
infrastructure investments, providing safe reliable power, and narrowly 
applying de-energization as the tool of last resort.  The CPUC stands 
empowered to incorporate infrastructure investments as a critical factor 
in its de-energization review, and in its decision to authorize a Safety 
 
 295. UPDATED 2020 WMP REPORT, supra note 132, at 7; see also PG&E 2021 WMP 
REPORT, supra note 132, at 558.  
 296. Id. See also CAMP FIRE REPORT, supra note 25, at 66 n.124 (acknowledging PG&E 
has not historically kept records of the age or material composition of its suspension hooks, 
despite suspension hooks being a common hardware in many of its transmission and 
distribution facilities—facilities inclusive of over 50,000 steel transmission structures, 
100,000 non-steel transmission structures, and over two million distribution poles). 
 297. See Van Derbeken, supra note 244 (comments by Mark Toney—the head of 
ratepayer advocacy group TURN—on the CPUC consideration of withholding PG&E Safety 
Certification) (“For really the first time we are seeing the CPUC not simply rubber stamp the 
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Certificate allowing utility access to the wildfire fund.  With shelter-in-
place orders, global pandemic, and a looming 2021 wildfire season, 
public safety demands bold CPUC action to hold utilities responsible for 
upgrading their electrical infrastructure. 
